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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE HUMAN
RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
Nestor M. Davidson
INTRODUCTION: A PEcuIAR SovEREIGNT-0
On April 10, 1945, a few months before the first atomic bomb test at
Trinity, New Mexico, doctors at a hospital near the Manhattan Project
installation at Oak Ridge, Tennessee injected the victim of a car accident
with plutonium. 2 Project staff neither informed the patient of the nature
of the experiment nor sought his consent.3 Federal officials, concerned
about the exposure of workers to radioactive materials, had ordered tests
on the effects of such materials on human metabolism. 4 So began a
nearly thirty-year program of similar experiments sponsored by a number
of federal agencies, all shrouded in absolute secrecy. The tests, which
would eventually be carried out on more than 16,000 subjects, 5 are
known today as the Human Radiation Experiments (HRE).6
The public first learned of the nature and extent of the experimenta-
tion in 1993.7 Almost immediately, victims and their descendants began
1. Herbert Marks, Dean Acheson's representative to a board appointed by President
Truman to devise civilian controls over atomic energy, observed, after a visit to the Los
Alamos, New Mexico facility of the Manhattan Project, that the nation's early atomic
program "was a separate state, with its own airplanes and its own factories and its thousands
of secrets. It had a peculiar sovereignty, one that could bring about the end, peacefully or
violently, of all other sovereignties." Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the
Hydrogen Bomb 231 (1995).
2. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Human Radiation Experiments: The Department of
Energy Roadmap to the Story and the Records 1-11 (1995) [hereinafter DOE Roadmap].
3. See Atomic Energy Comm'n, Information Report of the Atomic Energy
Commission on Disclosure to Patients Injected with Plutonium 6 (1974) [hereinafter AEC
Information Report] (noting lack of disclosure made to patients in plutonium injection
experiments); see also Advisory Comm. on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report
238-39 (1995) [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Final Report].
4. See AEC Information Report, supra note 3, at 2. The initial decision to begin the
experiments was made by the medical staff of the Manhattan Project, but the management
of the experiments later grew into a sizeable bureaucracy. See infra text accompanying
notes 134-141.
5. See Count of Subjects in Radiation Experiments is Raised to 16,000, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1995, at 27 (describing current estimates of the number of subjects in the Energy
Department report).
6. See generally DOE Roadmap, supra note 2.
7. In November, 1993, the Albuquerque Tribune published the results of a six-year
long investigation of plutonium experiments. The story received attention by several
national news sources, and shortly thereafter came to the attention of Secretary of Energy
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filing suit.8 These plaintiffs allege that the HRE violated a number of
constitutional protections, notably the substantive due process right to
bodily autonomy, but also the right to equal protection, and in cases in-
volving prisoners, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.9 While they have been able to sue individual federal officials for
damages under the constitutional tort theory of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,'0 plaintiffs have been pre-
cluded from asserting constitutional claims against the one entity that ap-
pears most responsible for the injuries they suffered: the United States
government." The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity pro-
tects the government from suit unless it has given its consent to be sued,
Hazel O'Leary. See Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Radiation Experimentation:
Constitutional Tort? International Human Rights Violation? 505, 511 (Jan. 1995) (syllabus,
Midwinter Convention of the Association of American Trial Lawyers) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). At Secretary O'Leary's urging, President Clinton established the
President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, tasked with
investigating the history of the government's activities. The panel worked for 18 months
uncovering previously secret documentation about the HRE, and issued its final report on
October 3, 1995. See Philip J. Hilts, Panel Urges U.S. to Apologize for Radiation Testing
and Pay Damages, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1995, at A19. At a White House ceremony accepting
the report, President Clinton established the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to
develop ethical standards for research on humans. See Danielle Gordon, The Verdict: No
Harm, No Foul, Bull. Atom. Scientists,Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 32, 40. The President also created
the Interagency Task Force on the Human Radiation Experiments, which has not yet
issued its final report. See Exec. Order No. 12,891, 59 Fed. Reg. 2935 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Shattuck v. MIT, No. 95-12605GAO (D. Mass. filed Dec. 18, 1995) (suit
arising out of experiments on children in Massachusetts); Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest
Research Found., No. 95-06410-HO (D. Or. filed Dec. 4, 1995) (suit arising out of tests
done on Oregon state prisoners); Heinrich v. Sweet, No. CV95-3845 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
21, 1995) (suit arising out of experiments conducted on patients at the Massachusetts
General Hospital and other hospitals); Mousso v. University of Rochester, No. 95-CV-
6288T (W.D.N.Y. filed June 16, 1995) (suit arising out of tests at the University of
Rochester). The plaintiffs in these suits are also seeking damages against private
institutions, as well as state and local officials who may have been involved in the
experiments. One HRE case has produced a reported opinion. Judge Beckwith of the
Southern District of Ohio ruled in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.
Ohio 1995), that plaintiffs, cancer patients whom government and private actors allegedly
subjected to radiation experiments under the guise of treatment, had sufficient
constitutional claims against individual officials for violations of the substantive due
process right of bodily autonomy, the right to access to courts, procedural due process, and
equal protection to survive motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. See infra
text accompanying notes 142-158, 161-173. The decision is currently pending on appeal
before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 157-176.
10. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
provides a cause of action for damages against individual federal officials in the absence of
congressional action. See id. at 397.
11. See Nancy Hogan, Shielded From Liability: Despite Admissions That It Used
Unwitting Citizens In Nuclear Tests, A Maze of Laws May Shelter the Government from
Ever Answering Their Claims in Court, A.BA.J., May 1994, at 56. None of the plaintiffs in
cases arising out of the HRE appear to have asserted claims directly against the federal
government for constitutional violations.
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and Congress has not waived the sovereign immunity of the United States
for damage suits to remedy constitutional violations.
Scholars have argued that where the federal government has violated
the Constitution, the Supreme Court should abrogate sovereign immu-
nity in the absence of congressional action and create a damage remedy
directly against the federal government.' 2 In the generation since Bivens,
however, no court has adopted these scholars' proposals, and sovereign
immunity continues to block damage actions against the federal govern-
ment when past constitutional violations are alleged.' 3 A number of inci-
dents of wide-scale abuse of fundamental rights by the federal govern-
ment have become public since Bivens was decided, 14 but the victims of
these excesses have been left to seek redress for constitutional violations
through the political process.' 5
12. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, Constitutional Torts 71 (1984) (arguing for judicial
abrogation of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts); Susan Bandes, Reinventing
Biven: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289, 345-50 (1995) (same);
Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 1532, 1556 (1972) (arguing for a "direct assault" on sovereign immunity in the
context of Bivens violations); Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After
Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 597, 666-68 (1982) (arguing for abrogation of sovereign
immunity arising out of policymaking); see also Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1427 (1987) (arguing that "no government entity can enjoy
plenary 'sovereign' immunity from a suit alleging a violation of [a] constitutional right").
13. Sovereign immunity has its greatest force in the modern context where a plaintiff
seeks damages after discovering that a constitutional violation has occurred. See Pullman
Constr. Indus. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1168 (1994) ("The only portion of the
United States' original immunity from suit that Congress continues to assert is a right not
to pay damages."). A number of avenues exist, of course, to challenge the constitutionality
of legislation prior to or during enforcement, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994),
for exceeding congressional power), and executive action, see, e.g., Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (waiving federal sovereign immunity for relief other
than damage actions).
14. In addition to the HRE, government actions that have emerged in the past 25
years include, among others, military LSD experiments, see United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669 (1987), open-air biological warfare experiments, see Nevin v. United States, 696
F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), and domestic spying on political
activists, see Don Edwards, Reordering the Priorities of the FBI in Light of the End of the
Cold War, 65 St.John's L. Rev. 59, 60 (1991) (discussing FBI investigations of thousands of
activists).
15. If the history of Bivens actions is any indication, plaintiffs have little prospect of
relief against the officials who operated the 1IRE. See Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens
Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 337, 343 (1989) ("Of the
some 12,000 Bivens suits filed [as of 1989], only thirty have resulted in judgments on behalf
of plaintiffs ... and only fourjudgments have actually been paid by the individual federal
defendants."). The overwhelming majority of Bivens actions are defeated by a combination
of narrow interpretations of constitutional violations which give rise to damages,
procedural hurdles, the qualified immunity of many officials, and defendants' limited
resources. See infra text accompanying notes 47-70. Additionally, plaintiffs in cases
arising out of the HRE face the difficulty of piecing together the facts of incidents that
occurred decades earlier under a veil of secrecy. See infra text accompanying notes
198-201.
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This Note will argue that while the general reluctance of the Court
to abrogate sovereign immunity is founded on sound policy considera-
tions, that reluctance is inappropriate when the federal government un-
dertakes a policy that constitutes a mass and systematic violation of consti-
tutional rights. Where it is clear that the normal oversight mechanisms of
the political process have failed, and certain threshold conditions are
met,1 6 the Court should create a cause of action against the government.
Part I of this Note explains why the present system does not allow
individuals to recover damages against the federal government for viola-
tions of the Constitution. It first describes the doctrine of constitutional
torts and its limitations. It then discusses sovereign immunity, and ex-
plains that Congress has retained sovereign immunity for constitutional
torts. It concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court's policy argu-
ments for not creating a cause of action against the government for con-
stitutional violations.
Part II explores the Human Radiation Experiments as a case study in
the remedial gaps created by the current scope of Bivens and sovereign
immunity. It discusses the particular constitutional torts arising out of
the HRE. It then attempts to demonstrate that the HRE as a whole repre-
sent a type of constitutional violation that is different in kind, not just in
degree, from typical Bivens cases. It concludes that this category of cases
can be better analogized to the law of torts governing large-scale injuries,
labeling it "constitutional mass torts."
Finally, Part III argues for judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity
for these constitutional mass torts. It notes that the political branches
have not acted to provide a remedy for HRE victims, leaving it to the
courts to vindicate their rights. Next, it discusses the power of the
Supreme Court to alter the current regime of sovereign immunity. Fi-
nally, building on the case study and responding to concerns discussed in
Part I, the Note concludes with a series of threshold criteria which, if met,
can guide the Court to limited, but necessary, action.
I. CONSTTUONAL TORTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrTY
The Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for damages
against federal officials under the Constitution in 1971 in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.17 Despite this deci-
sion, plaintiffs in Bivens suits have been prevented from recovering
against officials under this cause of action by a series of substantive and
procedural hurdles,' 8 and some have thus sought a remedy against the
16. This Note proposes certain criteria that limit the range of possible claims in which
a cause of action against the government should be allowed. See infra Part III.0.
17. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 47-70.
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government as a whole for constitutional violations.' 9 Sovereign immu-
nity, however, prevents aggrieved plaintiffs from recovering against the
United States.20 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to abrogate sov-
ereign immunity for constitutional violations in the absence of a waiver by
Congress, citing concerns about protecting the incentive that Bivens lia-
bility creates for individual officials and respecting the role of Congress as
the appropriate institution for creating new liability for the federal
government.2'
A. Constitutional Torts: Liability of Government Officials for Violations of the
Constitution
This section lays out the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of damage
remedies for constitutional violations. Beginning with Bivens, it explains
the rationale of the Court in creating the cause of action, and the ways in
which it has developed by analogy to traditional common law torts. This
section then explains that the combination of an interpretation that lim-
its the situations in which the violation of constitutional protections will
yield a damage remedy and a series of procedural hurdles has prevented
most potential Bivens plaintiffs from recovering.
1. Bivens: A Cause of Action Under the Constitution. - In Bivens, the
Court for the first time found a remedy in damages directly under the
Constitution in the absence of explicit statutory authority.22 On the
19. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994); Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d
348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987); Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
20. Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for most
common law actions, but not for constitutional torts. See infra text accompanying notes
95-120.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 121-132.
22. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Bivens was decided under the general grant ofjurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1994), which provides that federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." See
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1988) (clarifying the basis of Bivens
jurisdiction). It is important to note that Congress has granted federal district courts
jurisdiction over claims arising under the Constitution. Otherwise, federal courts could
not hear Bivens claims. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1364 (1953)
(discussing the ability of Congress to control federal jurisdiction).
The first indication from the Supreme Court that it could create such a remedy came
decades earlier, in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), a case involving alleged violations of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There
the Court stated that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief." Id. at 684. The Court in Bell, however, did not exercise the power it
discussed, holding only that the district court had improperly dismissed plaintiff's
complaint for lack ofjurisdiction, and remanding to determine whether the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments had been violated, and, if so, whether damages were the proper
remedy. See id. at 684-85. See generally Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum.
1996] 1207
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morning of November 26, 1965, six federal narcotics officers entered
Webster Bivens's apartment and arrested him for alleged narcotics viola-
tions.23 They manacled him in front of his wife and children, threatened
to arrest his entire family, took him to a federal courthouse, and interro-
gated him.24 Bivens was released without being charged. Had the Bu-
reau of Narcotics tried to prosecute Bivens, Fourth Amendment doctrine
likely would have made any evidence gathered pursuant to the agents'
search inadmissible.25 Because no prosecution went forward, Bivens
sought the only available remedy: damages.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court, citing Mar-
bury v. Madison26 for the proposition that the "very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury, '27 found a cause of action
against the federal narcotics officers directly under the Fourth Amend-
ment.28 The Court reviewed the long-standing power of the federal
courts to create legal remedies, 29 and noted that damages have tradition-
L. Rev. 1109, 1112-13 (1969) (discussing the Court's power to create remedies under the
Constitution); Al Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the
Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 44-51 (1968) (discussing the history of
the power of courts to craft damage remedies).
The Court moved a step closer to Bivens in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961),
when for the first time it interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958)
(amended 1979 to encompass the District of Columbia), to provide damages for
constitutional violations by state officials. Section 1983 currentiy provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Although the majority of constitutional torts cases are decided
under § 1983, the statute provides no remedy for violations by federal officials. See Peter
H. Schuck, Suing Government 48-51 (1983).
23. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 391-92. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Bivens alleged that the arrest and search of his home
was done without a warrant, and that the arrest was made with unreasonable force and
without probable cause. See Bivens. 403 U.S. at 889. The Court has long adhered to a rule
whereby evidence, no matter how probative, is excluded from criminal cases when
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
392-93, 398 (1914).
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
27. Id. at 163. The argument that every injury deserves a remedy is itself a subject of
considerable debate. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality
Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 735, 753-67 (1992) (describing the
inadequate fit between federal rights and judicially-created remedies).
28. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
29. See id. at 895-96. Bivens has sparked a debate in the literature about the nature
of the Court's invocation of the federal judicial power to craft remedies in the absence of a
congressional mandate. One commentator has argued that Bivens represents
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ally been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
liberty interests.30 The Court concluded by alluding to two potential
means of defeating a constitutional cause of action. The Court implied it
would not create a cause of action if presented with "special factors coun-
selling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,"3' or if
there were an alternative remedy available which was "equally effective in
the view of Congress."3 2
Justice Harlan, in concurrence, elaborated on the rationale for the
Court's decision to create a new cause of action.3 3 ForJustice Harlan, the
question concerned the necessity, and not merely the advisability, of cre-
ating a remedy. As he stated,
it is apparent that some form of damages is the only possible
remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position. It will be a rare
case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be
able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any
"subconstitutional" decisionmaking that derives its power from the traditional ability of
federal courts to create interstitial remedies in federal statutory schemes. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (1975).
Other scholars have argued, however, that Bivens was decided under the traditional power
of the Court to interpret the Constitution. See Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh,
Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1135-38 (1978);
see also Bandes, supra note 12, at 329-30 (discussing this debate among scholars and
supporting the claim that the Bivens exercise of judicial power was constitutional
interpretation, not constitutional common law). The Court, in the degree of deference it
has given to implied congressional intent in the development of Bivens remedies, has
leaned more towards Professor Monaghan's view of the doctrine. See, e.g., Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (finding that the remedial scheme created in the Social
Security administrative system obviates the need for a cause of action under the
Constitution).
30. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395. In other words, where rights have been invaded, for
example by the violation of a federal statute, federal courts have traditionally provided the
victim of that violation a remedy in damages. See id. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946)); see also Katz, supra note 22, at 39-44 (discussing the long history of legal
remedies for government violations of rights). Indeed, there has traditionally been a
strong preference for legal over equitable remedies as the classic requirement for the
exercise of a court's equity jurisdiction is the absence or unavailability of an adequate
remedy at law indicated. See Maurice Rosenberg et al., Elements of Civil Procedure 97
(5th ed. 1990).
81. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. The Court in Bivens noted the absence of such "special
factors"-specifically that the case did not involve a question of "federal fiscal policy"-but
did not elaborate on what else might qualify as a special factor. See id. The Court has
subsequently relied heavily on this exception to decline to create remedies in potential
Bivens cases. See infra text accompanying notes 47-58.
32. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
33. Justice Harlan's concurrence is frequently cited for propositions related to the
reasoning of Bivens. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (citing Justice
Harlan's concurrence in noting the importance of providing remedies despite limited
judicial resources); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (citingJustice Harlan's
concurrence for the proposition that a Bivens-type action could be vital to remedy
constitutional violations).
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court. .... For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing.34
Concerns about creating a cause of action when Congress had not acted
were mitigated by the judiciary's "particular responsibility to assure the
vindication of constitutional interests."3 5 Justice Harlan argued that the
Bill of Rights was meant to protect individuals in the face of popular will;
if the popular will, as expressed in Congress, failed to provide an avenue
for vindicating constitutional rights, it was appropriate for the judiciary to
craft a remedy.36
2. The Development of Constitutional Torts by Analogy to Traditional
Common Law Torts. - When the Court concluded that a damage remedy
was the appropriate relief to grant Webster Bivens, it built upon the foun-
dation of common law torts to define the scope of the constitutional ac-
tion. Ever since, traditional tort law has infused the law of constitutional
violations in areas ranging from the question of whether to create liability
for a particular constitutional provision to the scope of the relief to be
granted if a cause of action is found.37 In his concurrence in Bivens,
Justice Harlan noted that it was within the sphere ofjudicial competence
to create remedies for violations of the Fourth Amendment.38 "[T]he
experience of judges in dealing with private trespass and false imprison-
ment claims,"Justice Harlan argued, "supports the conclusion that courts
of law are capable of making the types ofjudgment concerning causation
34. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring). Commentators have drawn
on Justice Harlan's statement to support arguments that sovereign immunity should be
abrogated for constitutional torts. See Davis, supra note 12, at 186; Dellinger, supra note
12, at 1550. Justice Harlan's concurrence is laconic about sovereign immunity, simply
stating that "[hiowever desirable a direct remedy against the Government might be as a
substitute for individual officer liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit."
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court did not directly
comment again on the issue of the judiciary creating liability against the United States in
the context of constitutional torts until its decision in FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994).
See infra text accompanying notes 121-132.
35. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. See id. Justice Black, in his dissent in Bivens, warned of the potential for flooding
the federal docket with frivolous lawsuits. See id. at 428-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
37. While courts have drawn from common law torts to define certain elements of
constitutional torts, the standards applied in constitutional torts are not coterminous with
state tort law. For example, the care required for prison medical care providers under the
Eighth Amendment is not defined by traditional negligence. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77
Geo. UJ. 1441, 1460-63 (1989). Even in the Eighth Amendment context, however, courts
still use traditional tort language to describe a § 1983 injury. See id. at 1463.
For an excellent discussion of the development of judicial conceptions of
constitutional torts, see generally Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for
Constitutional Torts, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 225 (1986) (discussingjudicial language developed
in the context of constitutional tort cases involving individual defendants that has been
unadaptable to suits involving institutional defendants under § 1983).
38. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation
for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights. 39
The valuation of damages is an illustrative example of an element of
a constitutional tort that derives from common law torts.4° In Carey v.
Piphus, the Supreme Court decided that students denied procedural due
process while being suspended were only entitled to recover "nominal
damages not to exceed one dollar."41 The Court quoted a torts treatise
for the proposition that damages should only compensate persons for
actual injuries, not for the mere deprivation of rights. 4 2 Carey, then, tied
the remedy for a deprivation of constitutional rights to the same ques-
tions of valuation that arise in the context of personal injury and similar
traditional actions, despite the clear conceptual difference in the types of
harm represented by each violation. 43
On a practical level, the types of claims that predominate in constitu-
tional torts litigation have helped link the emergence of this doctrine to
traditional individual to individual torts. The overwhelming majority of
constitutional tort claims arise out of "street-level" contact with low and
mid-level officials carrying out governmental programs in the day-to-day
course of business. 44 It is natural in that environment for courts to have
drawn on the elements of traditional private liability to define the nature
of the relevant injury in constitutional torts.45
3. The RetreatfromJudicial Action After Bivens. - Courts have defined
the elements of constitutional torts, then, have squarely within the tradi-
tional understanding of common law torts. As will be seen, however, tort
law itself has undergone significant changes as it has faced liability gener-
ated by institutional actors.46 The significance of the connection be-
tween common law torts and constitutional torts will be explored in Part
39. Id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan then noted in a footnote that
arguments from judicial competence would vary with the nature of the constitutionally
protected interest. See id. at n.9 (Harlan,J., concurring). In other words, causes of action
arising from some constitutional provisions would more closely mirror the types of claims
with which judges were familiar from the common law context than those arising from
others.
40. See Davis, supra note 12, at 286-92.
41. 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978). Carey was decided under the authority of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1978) (amended 1979 to encompass the District of Columbia).
42. See id. at 255 (quoting 2 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., Law of Torts
§ 25.1, at 1299 (1956)).
43. In the case of traditional torts, the harm to be compensated for is actual injury,
while in the case of constitutional torts, the injury derives from governmental abuse of
power that may or may not have concrete consequences for the victim. See Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 808-10 (1986) (holding that damages
based on abstract "importance" or "value" of constitutional rights are not a permissible
element of compensatory damages in constitutional tort actions).
44. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 60-61 (describing the work environment in which
most government tort liability is generated).
45. See Whitman, supra note 37, at 225.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 178-188.
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II, but it is important first to understand the limitations of the Bivens
cause of action.
Bivens held out the brief promise of a new jurisprudence of constitu-
tional remedies. At first, the Supreme Court and various circuit courts
found the principle of Bivens applicable to other provisions of the Bill of
Rights.47 Soon, however, the Court began narrowing the scope of possi-
ble Bivens actions, giving greater weight to the two grounds available for
defeating such claims, special factors counselling hesitation and adequate
alternative remedies, 48 increasingly emphasizing deference to legislative
and executive prerogatives. 49
In Chappell v. Wallace,50 the Court refused to find a cause of action
for enlisted military personnel alleging unconstitutional racial discrimina-
tion on the grounds that both the conditions of military service and the
constitutional grant of authority to Congress over the military justice sys-
tem51 constituted "special factors" sufficient to defeat the claim.52 Even
an implied desire by Congress to preempt constitutional remedies was
found to overcome a plaintiff's potential Bivens claim. In Bush v. Lucas,
the Court declined to find a cause of action under the First Amendment
for a federal employee who alleged that he had been demoted for mak-
ing public statements critical of his agency.53 The Court found that the
administrative remedy Congress had created for employment disputes
was a sufficient "special factor"54 to defeat the cause of action, despite the
fact that existing remedies did not provide as complete a level of relief as
47. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d
Cir. 1975) (First Amendment); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfield, 410 F. Supp. 144
(D.D.C. 1976) (Sixth Amendment); see also Travis, supra note 12, at 598 n.7 (noting
extensions of Bivens).
Carlson marked the zenith of the Court's broad interpretation of Bivens. There the
Court emphasized that a federal court had to hear such a claim unless the special factors
counselling hesitation or the presence of an alternative remedy alluded to in Bivens were
present. See Carson, 446 U.S. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring) (characterizing the majority
opinion as an extension of previous understanding of Bivens). Although the language of
possible exceptions was drawn from Bivens, the Carlson Court read them narrowly,
implying a shift in favor of finding remedies. See id.
48. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages
Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1117. 1126-27 (1989) (discussing recent cases on the Bivens "special
factors" exception).
50. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). In Chappell, five Navy enlisted men brought a suit against
their commanding officers alleging constitutional violations. See id. at 297.
51. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
52. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300-05; see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,
680-81 (1987) (finding no Bivens action allowable by military personnel whenever an
injury arises out of activity "incident to service").
53. 462 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1983). William C. Bush, an aerospace engineer at NASA's
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, was demoted for publicly criticizing the agency.
Bush failed to find a remedy through the administrative civil service system, so he asserted
a Bivens claim. See id. at 369-72.
54. Id. at 375.
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a Bivens suit.55 Finally, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, recipients of Social Security
benefits sought damages against federal officials under the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause alleging improper termination of benefits.5 6
The Court declined to find a Bivens remedy on the ground that the Social
Security disability system represented a complex series of policy com-
promises with which the Court was hesitant to tamper.57
All told, Bivens now applies in a relatively narrow band of cases in
which Congress has provided no remedy, or has no constitutional grant
of specific authority sufficient to signal the need for particular judicial
deference.58
4. Hurdles Facing Bivens Plaintiffs. - Beyond the substantive limits
imposed on Bivens by the Court's recent cases restricting the doctrine's
application, plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from federal officials
for violations of the Constitution face the challenges of official immunity,
a range of procedural hurdles, and the limited financial resources of
most defendants.
a. Official Immunity. - The Court checks the potential drain on the
resources of Bivens defendants and on the government by allowing offi-
cials two types of immunity.59 Some federal officials enjoy absolute im-
munity for their actions,60 but the majority enjoy only "qualified" immu-
nity.6 ' In Butz v. Economou, a case involving a suit against the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Court in defining this qualified immunity held that fed-
55. See id. at 388.
56. 487 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1988).
57. See id. at 428-29.
58. Even where a cause of action can be found under the Constitution, the scope of
Bivens liability is carefully circumscribed. In Bivens cases, for example, respondeat superior
liability is not available, so that a plaintiff cannot sue supervisors or other responsible
individuals for the wrongdoing of their subordinates. See, e.g., Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d
1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that "respondeat superior is inapplicable to Bivens
actions"); Sportique Fashions, Inc. v. Sullivan, 597 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting
that subordinate employees should be considered fellow servants of the United States);
Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the general
doctrine of respondeat superior is not sufficient to make out a Bivens claim).
59. In Bivens itself, the Court remanded on the question of the scope of the immunity
of the six narcotics agents who had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The
Second Circuit found no absolute immunity, but allowed the officials immunity to the
degree that they acted in good faith. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972).
60. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (absolute immunity for the
President); Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503, 503 (1927) (absolute immunity for federal
prosecutors); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wail.) 335, 354 (1871) (absolute immunity for
federal judges).
61. For common law tort actions against government employees acting within the
scope of their employment, Congress mandated under the Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat.
4563 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (1994)), that the United
States be substituted as a defendant, and no personal liability allowed. See infra notes
117-118 and accompanying text. Qualified immunity as the Supreme Court has defined it,
then, currently only applies to liability arising from constitutional torts.
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eral officials would be shielded from personal liability unless they violated
a constitutional provision whose meaning they knew or reasonably should
have known was clearly established at the time of the violation.62 Lower
courts, applying the subjective element of this test, allowed plaintiffs to
question officials about intent and state of mind. As a consequence, in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that the qualified immunity defense
would turn solely on an "objective" examination of what a reasonable offi-
cial would have known at the time of the violation, and that such an in-
quiry should occur prior to any discovery, allowing courts to dismiss cases
before exposing government officials to the burdens of preparing for
trial.63 In both Butz and Harlow the Court was concerned with the poten-
tial burden on official action.64 The Court in Butz argued that there is a
great need "to protect officials who are required to exercise their discre-
tion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise
of official authority."65
b. Procedural Obstacles to Recovery Under Bivens. - Courts presented
with Bivens suits construe jurisdiction, venue, and other preliminary liti-
gation issues in favor of government officials, creating additional burdens
for'plaintiffs. 66 Furthermore, any determination that a Bivens action sur-
vives a motion to dismiss is appealable on an interlocutory basis, 67 and
given the -concern that the functioning of government should not be
overly burdened by the threat of personal liability for government offi-
cials, courts regularly stay all discovery until such appeals are concluded,
further delaying any recovery.68
62. 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978). Qualified immunity of federal officials applies to
the same extent as that accorded state officials in the § 1983 context. See id. at 507
(finding that federal executive officers are only entitled to the qualified immunity
specified for state officials in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).
63. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987) ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.").
64. Another rationale underlying the Court's qualified immunity doctrine for officials
accused of committing constitutional torts is the need to provide a predictable standard for
evaluating potential liability. SeeJohn E. Nordin II, The Constitutional Liability of Federal
Employees: Bivens Claims, 41 Fed. B. News & J. 342, 342 (discussing the qualified
immunity objective test).
65. Butz, 438 U.S. at 506. Similarly, in Harlow, the Court raised the pleading standard
out of concern for the costs of subjecting officials to trial, including "distraction of officials
from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able
people from public service." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
66. See Rosen, supra note 15, at 345.
67. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985) (holding that denial of claim
of qualified immunity is appealable as final order).
68. See Nordin, supra note 64, at 344 (discussing the practice of courts in Bivens cases
to address immunity questions before any discovery commences); Rosen, supra note 15, at
356-57. If a Bivens claim moves beyond the qualified immunity stage, discovery can be
complicated by the fact that some federal agencies limit disclosure of documents or
information in cases in which the United States is not a party. See Nordin, supra note 64,
at 344.
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c. Limited Resources of Federal Officials. - A final hurdle remains for
plaintiffs seeking recovery for constitutional violations by federal officials.
Most suits against government employees are against lower and mid-level
officials. 69 Federal officials, particularly career employees, are not likely
to have the personal financial resources to warrant the cost and difficulty
of litigating claims against them.7 0 This is not to say that all federal em-
ployees lack financial resources, but rather that those who implement
policies or act in ways that violate the Constitution are not the best situ-
ated to redress any resulting injuries.
In sum, the Court created a right of action in Bivens that has been
circumscribed both by the level of deference given to Congress and the
procedural hurdles created by the reluctance of courts to burden the
executive.
B. The Doctrinal Framework of Federal Sovereign Immunity
Given the limitations of the Bivens cause of action, it might seem
natural to seek a damage remedy against the government, rather than
against a particular official. Sovereign immunity, however, prevents such
a remedy. Sovereign immunity, simply put, is the common law doctrine
that a government cannot be sued absent consent. This section explores
the roots of sovereign immunity, and its nature as a common law rather
than constitutional doctrine.7 ' It then notes that Congress has largely
waived the immunity of the United States, but that, in seeking to protect
policymaking discretion and the ability of the executive to exedute the
laws unfettered by the burden of excessive litigation, it has retained im-
munity for constitutional torts.
1. The Development of Federal Sovereign Immunity. - The early history
of sovereign immunity in the United States reveals little about why the
doctrine is so firmly rooted today. The issue was not debated at the Con-
69. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 60-61.
70. See George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1175 (1977) (noting that "officials often lack the means to satisfy
judgments rendered against them"). The salaries of career civil service employees are
governed by the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) General Schedule, which sets
salaries based on "grade" (level of position) and "step" (level of tenure). The annual
income of an employee earning at the highest grade of the schedule, GS-15, and the
highest level of experience, level 10, is currently $88,326. See 60 Fed. Reg. 7336 (1995)
(laying out OPM's general pay schedule).
71. In England, by 1789, the proposition that the sovereign could not be sued without
consent had been slowly developing for centuries. While the doctrine stood as a nominal
bar to suits against the government, a number of legal fictions blunted its consequences.
See Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
1108 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] ("Many scholars have argued that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it had evolved in England prior to 1789, was less about
whether the Crown or its agents could be sued than about how."). The primary effect of the
do~trine was to channel forms of pleading, not to deny relief. For an excellent overview of
the development of sovereign immunity, see Louis L.Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963).
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stitutional Convention,7 2 and little is known about how the immunity
doctrine was treated in the colonial courts.73 The Constitution is silent
on the issue, although Article III allows jurisdiction to be granted for
"Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party,"74 at least im-
plying an ability to render the United States amenable to suit.75 Further-
more, there is some ambiguous evidence that the Framers intended to
abolish sovereign immunity, at least for the states. 76 Evidence from the
state ratifying conventions and the Judiciary Act of 1789, which imple-
mented Article III, is equally equivocal about reigning sentiment.77
Sovereign immunity was first addressed by the Supreme Court in
1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia.78 Faced with the question of whether Article
III allowed jurisdiction in a suit against a state, four of the five justices on
the Court found Georgia amenable to suit in its sovereign capacity, ab-
sent consent, indicating a sharp break with traditional monarchist con-
ceptions of sovereignty.7 9 In 1794, Congress, reacting to the widespread
72. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 36. Professor Amar asserts that sovereign immunity,
and the vesting of discretion to waive the doctrine in Congress, is inconsistent with the
founders' understanding of popular sovereignty. He argues that the "single idea" of
popular sovereignty "informs every article of the Federalist Constitution, from the
Preamble to Article VII." See Amar, supra note 12, at 1439. To Amar, the Constitution
reflected a conscious decision to reject the English conception of sovereignty as King-in-
Parliament, and was instead modeled on the corporate examples of the early colonial
compacts and state constitutions. Amar finds support for this concept of popular
sovereignty in Madison's Federalist No. 46:
The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of
the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different
purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the
people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these
different establishments not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as
uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of
each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must
be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides
in the people alone ....
Id. at 1449-50 (quoting The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison)).
73. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 36.
74. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
75. But see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 71, at 1109 n.2 (noting that the Supreme
Court, in the "discredited" decision in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), held
that the language only applied to the United States as a plaintiff). See generally id. at 1109
(discussing the history of the amenability of the United States to suit).
76. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 44.
77. See id.
78. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
79. Chief'Justice Jay noted the distinction between England's feudal system and the
fledgling American system of popular sovereignty. He concluded that such feudal notions
as not being able to subject the sovereign to suit in his own court did not "obtain here; at
the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns
of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects... and have none to govern but
themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the
sovereignty." Id. at 471-72; see also Schuck, supra note 22, at 45 (discussing the concept of
popular sovereignty expounded in the opinions of ChiefJustice Jay and Justice Wilson).
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fear of the vulnerability of states to suits for debt, proposed the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution, which sought to withdraw from the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over suits against a state by citizens of another
state.8 0
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1798, left open
the question of the sovereign immunity of the United States, but the
Court never engaged in a serious debate about the issue. Beginning with
Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Cohens v. Virginia that "no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States,"81 the Court recog-
nized and defended federal sovereign immunity.82 By 1882, Justice
Miller was able to write, in United States v. Lee, that "the principle that the
United States cannot be lawfully sued without its consent in any case... is
conceded to be the established law of this country."8 3 By the end of the
nineteenth century, then, the Supreme Court had taken a doctrine of
sovereignty developed in England to protect the monarch, and, with little
explanation, made it a prerogative of Congress.8 4
Chief Justice Jay, however, distinguished between state sovereign immunity and
federal sovereign immunity on the ground that an Article III court had the aid of the
federal executive when challenging the former, but not when challenging the latter. See
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 478. As Professor Schuck has pointed out, ChiefJustice Jay's
argument would have undermined every decision asserting judicial authority against a
coordinate branch, from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) to United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 688 (1974). See Schuck, supra note 22, at 36.
80. The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects or any Foreign
State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has not, however, read the Eleventh
Amendment to stand as an absolute bar to actions for injunctive relief. In a series of
decisions culminating in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court held that state
officials were amenable to suit in federal court, even when those officials were acting under
the cloak of state authority, as long as the state was not being sued in its own name. See id.
at 150-55; Schuck, supra note 22, at 45-46.
81. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
82. The first case squarely decided on the ground of federal sovereign immunity did
not come until 1846, in United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846). There,
the Court rejected a bill in equity to enjoin enforcement of ajudgment at law in favor of
the federal government. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 71, at 1109.
83. 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882). The Court in Lee listed cases upholding federal
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15 (1869); The Siren, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 152 (1868); Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195 (1860); Hill v. United
States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286
(1846); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
84. In order to provide a mechanism for policing the excesses of the government
despite sovereign immunity, courts in the United States, like their English counterparts,
developed a complex jurisprudence of officer suits. In Lee, for example, the Court allowed
an ejectment action by a titleholder against two federal officials who had charge of the
Arlington, Virginia estate of General Robert E. Lee's wife, which the United States
government had purchased after an alleged failure to pay a tax assessment. See Lee, 106
U.S. at 197; Jaffe, supra note 71, at 23. The Court allowed the action, even though it
affected property in the possession of the federal government. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 223.
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2. The Common Law Origins of Sovereign Immunity. - As the develop-
ment of sovereign immunity in the United States indicates, the doctrine
has a common law, rather than constitutional, foundation.8 5 Although
some members of the Supreme Court have stated that sovereign immu-
nity can be found in the Constitution,8 6 nothing about the immunity of
the government to suit appears in the text of the Constitution.8 7 The
Court has generally made no pretense of finding a constitutional basis for
sovereign immunity, but has instead invoked its long tradition.8 8
Justice Holmes rationalized the doctrine of sovereign immunity on
the "logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."8 9
While this may be true of federal statutory causes of action, the
Constitution is the "authority that makes the law" in constitutional torts
85. See Travis, supra note 12, at 617-21 (discussing the nature of sovereign
immunity). Understanding sovereign immunity as a common law and not a constitutional
doctrine is significant in the context of its potential judicial abrogation. See infra text
accompanying notes 216-231.
The Supreme Court is currently engaged in a similar, although not directly analogous,
debate about the nature of sovereign immunity in the context of state sovereignty under
the Eleventh Amendment. Recently, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996),
the Court, by a 5-4 majority, found that Congress' commerce power was not sufficient to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in an Article III court. See id. at 1131-32. Justice
Souter's dissent, however, forcefully argued, among other things, that constitutionalizing
state sovereign immunity in federal court under an atextual reading of the Eleventh
Amendment represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of sovereign
immunity as a common-law doctrine. See id. at 1159-65 (Souter, J., dissenting). As
discussed above, the amenability of the United States to suit absent consent in an Article III
court, under the general jurisdictional grant to hear constitutional claims contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), presents a distinct question from the amenability of state to suit in
federal court. See supra note 79. But the debate evinced by Seminole Tribe can give insight
into the active and ongoing nature of this controversy.
86. See e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1945)
(arguing that sovereign immunity is "embodied in the Constitution"); cf. Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution did not
repeal sovereign immunity).
87. See Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1354 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Federal
sovereign immunity derives from public law, but it is not explicit in either the Constitution
or statutes.").
88. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) ("The immunity of a truly
independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute
right for centuries.").
89. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.). This rationale
has been extended in some cases to an assertion that sovereign immunity is a question of
an affirmative grant ofjurisdiction. Absent consent to be sued, this rationale holds, there
is no jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940). But see Pullman
Constr. Indus. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that federal
sovereign immunity is not jurisdictional, but rather better thought of as "a right to prevail
at trial").
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claims, not Congress.90 In other words, the source of the authority of
Congress and the executive to act is the Constitution, and, since Marbury
v. Madison,91 the Court has had the power and the duty to review those
actions-legislation or execution of the law-through the lens of the
Constitution. Admittedly, the long tradition of reviewing acts of Congress
and the actions of the executive for unconstitutionality in the course of
deciding cases and controversies does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that the Court has the power to invoke the Constitution to overcome
sovereign immunity. As the cases leading up to Bivens, and Bivens itself,
made clear, however, the "judicial power" in Article III includes the tradi-
tional powers of courts to find remedies for cognizable violations of
rights. 92 Marbury rationalized judicial review by arguing that a court re-
viewing two sources of law, a statute and the Constitution, was bound to
hold the one up against the other and resolve any conflict in favor of the
higher authority, the Constitution.93 While it is less traditional to under-
take this comparison in the context of questions of allowing damages, if
the only bar to a court finding a remedy against the government is a
common law doctrine, sovereign immunity, then Marbury would indicate
that constitutional necessity should take precedence. 94
3. Congressional Retention of Sovereign Immunity for Constitutional Torts.
- Over the past two hundred years Congress has waived the sovereign
immunity of the United States in a haphazard manner.95 It has waived
sovereign immunity for most common law actions96 while stressing a con-
90. See U.S. Const. art. VI. ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land"); see alsojaffe, supra note 71, at 4-5 (critiquingjustice Holmes's view of sovereign
immunity on the ground that the concept of a unitary sovereign that informed the
development of sovereign immunity in England does not translate to the United States).
91. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 26-36.
93. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77. A court would be faced with the same
conflict, for example, when reviewing an administrative regulation in light of the agency's
organic statute. Any conflict between the two would have to be resolved in favor of the
higher source of authority, the statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
94. One could argue that because sovereign immunity was understood to be an
element of the judicial power at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, any
limitations on that power would have been incorporated. The opinions of the majority of
Justices in Chisholm, however, belie this contention. See supra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1163 (1996) (SouterJ.,
dissenting) (noting the "widespread agreement [among the Framers] that ratification
would not itself entail a general reception of the common law of England").
95. Professor Schuck describes remedies Congress has allowed against the United
States as "ajerry-built structure, a patchwork, a doctrinal stew." Schuck, supra note 22, at
51.
96. Beyond the general waivers of sovereign immunity contained in the legislation
discussed in this section, namely, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (1994), and the TuckerAct, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491(a)(1) (1994), Congress
has specifically waived sovereign immunity for federal agencies in two important ways.
First, Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act in 1976 to waive sovereign
immunity for suits against agencies for relief other than monetary damages. See 5 U.S.C.
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cem for preserving policymaking discretion and the ability of the execu-
tive to vigorously implement the law.97 Despite ambiguous statutory lan-
guage that could have allowed actions against the federal government for
constitutional violations, courts have consistently interpreted waivers of
sovereign immunity to foreclose this option.98
a. The Court of Claims and the Tucker Act. - Congress began waiving
federal sovereign immunity in 1855 with the establishment of the Court
of Claims, which was empowered to hear government contract cases.99
In 1887, the Tucker Act'00 expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims to include, with some exceptions, all "claims founded upon the
Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress." x0 ' The Tucker
§ 702 (1994). This waiver only applies to injunctions blocking unconstitutional acts before
or while they occur, it is of no avail to a plaintiff seeking damages for constitutional
violations after the fact.
Second, Congress has included in many statutes that establish agencies a "sue-and-be-
sued" clause which the Court regularly interprets to effect a broad waiver of sovereign
immunity. In Federal Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940), for example, the
Court held that "such waivers by Congress .. .should be liberally construed." The
Supreme Court still adheres to the Burr holding, despite the narrowness of the Court's
approach to other waivers of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996,
1003 (1994). See generallyJohn C. Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear
Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 771 (1995) (critiquing the Supreme Court's strong
"clear statement rule" for waivers of sovereign immunity). This broad waiver, however, has
not been found to afford a plaintiff a remedy in damages against the agency for
constitutional violations. The Court in Meyer, despite finding that the sue-and-be-sued
clause at issue waived sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, held that the waiver was
not sufficient to create a cause of action. Instead, it found that a cause of action would
require a separatejudicial fiat. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1005. For a discussion of Meyer, and
its significance in providing the Court's rationale for not creating causes of action against
the federal government, see infra text accompanying notes 121-132.
Congress has also consented to suit against the United States in specified land
disputes, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2409-2410 (1994); for patent and copyright infringement, see 28
U.S.C. § 1498 (1994); in certain disputes with contractors, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2)
(1994); for specified claims by Indian tribes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994); and in certain
maritime cases, see 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1988) (Public Vessels Act). See Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 71, at 1145 n.1, and sources cited therein.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 105-110.
98. Moreover, the Court consistently interprets waivers of immunity in favor of the
sovereign. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)
("Waivers of the Government's sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be unequivocally
expressed.... [T]he Government's consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor
of the sovereign.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The interpretation
of sue-and-be-sued clauses is a notable exception to this basic canon of construction. See
supra note 96.
99. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1491-1509 (1994)).
100. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2),
1491(a)(1) (1994)). The Tucker Act explicitly limits the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims-and thus the waiver of sovereign immunity that it represented-to claims that do
not arise in tort. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). For further discussion, see Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 71, at 1145.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1).
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Act, however, conferred no substantive rights, but merely waived the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States where such a right could be found.
In order to gain relief under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must "demon-
strate that the source of the substantive law.... 'can fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage
sustained.' "102 While constitutional claims under the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment have satisfied this requirement, 0 3 lower
courts have rejected Tucker Actjurisdiction for violations of other consti-
tutional provisions.'0 4
b. The Federal Tort Claims Act. - Well into the twentieth century,
damages for tort claims against the United States were only available
through private acts enacted by Congress. In 1946, Congress passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),105 which waived sovereign immunity for
most common law torts. Congress, seeking to protect the ability of the
Executive to act, carved out an exception for "discretionary func-
tion[s]."' 0 6 The Court has interpreted this exception broadly to avoid
102. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
104. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 71, at 1146 (citing Featheringill v. United
States, 217 Ct. Cl. 24, 33 (1978) (First Amendment) and Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d
227, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process, Sixth
Amendment's counsel and fair trial provisions, and Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause)).
105. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. 4, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994)).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994) (providing that there is no waiver of sovereign im-
munity for any "claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused"). See
generally William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 Admin. LJ. 1 (1993) (surveying the
evolution of the judiciary's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)).
In the FTCA, Congress retained sovereign immunity in a few other specified instances.
First, sovereign immunity was not waived for liability arising out of the intentional torts of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h). In 1974, with the Intentional Tort Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88
Stat. 50, 50 (1974) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994), Congress waived this exception
for suits arising out of the acts of federal investigative or law enforcement officers. See
generally Jack Boger et aL., The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment:
An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 497 (1976) (discussing the history and practical
consequences of the Intentional Torts Amendment). Second, Congress has retained
sovereign immunity in eleven narrow areas. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (loss, miscarriage, or
negligent transmission of letters or postal matter); (c) (tax or customs duty collection); (d)
(certain admiralty claims); (e) (administering the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917);
(f) (for quarantines); (i) (fiscal operation of the Treasury or the regulation of the
monetary system); (j) (combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war); (k) (claim arising in a foreign country); (1) (Tennessee Valley
Authority); (in) (Panama Canal Company); and (n) (activities of a federal local bank, a
federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives).
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allowing tort suits to be the vehicle for testing the consequences of poli-
cymaking. 10 7 The federal government will be immune from liability in
tort if the contested act "involves an element of judgment or choice"'108
based on considerations of public policy. 10 9 This immunity applies to the
discretionary acts of even the lowest-level official. 110
Courts have generally rejected arguments for recognizing a remedy
for constitutional torts under the FTCA. The Supreme Court in FDIC v.
Meyer"' held that the reference to "the law of the place" in the FTCA's
jurisdictional provision" 2 only encompasses violations that arise out of
state law. 1 3 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Pereira v. United States Postal
Service, the FTCA only waives sovereign immunity for tortious conduct "if
107. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) (finding that if a
regulation mandates a particular course of action, and the relevant federal official follows
that course of action, the government will not be liable in tort for promulgating such
regulation); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538-39, 544 (1988) (finding that the
government could only be liable in tort for actions arising out of consequences of
policymaking where federal officials deviate from mandated procedure); United States v.
SA Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)
(noting that purpose of discretionary function exception is to "prevent judicial 'second-
guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort").
108. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
109. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537. The Court in Gaubert
explained the distinction between discretionary functions immune from tort liability and
discretionary functions for which the Federal Tort Claims Act allow relief with a
hypothetical involving the negligent driving of a car by a government agent. Even though
driving a car requires the "constant exercise of discretion," that discretion is not grounded
in policy, and thus any negligence that derives from the actions of that agent creates
liability. See Gaubert 499 U.S. at 325 n.7.
110. See VarigAirines, 467 U.S. at 813.
111. 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
113. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1001-02. At issue in Meyer was whether the FTCA-and
its enumerated exceptions-was the exclusive remedy for alleged constitutional violations,
or whether the plaintiff could sue the FSLIC (the predecessor agency to the FDIC) under
the agency's own sue-and-be-sued clause. See id. In other words, the plaintiff was seeking
to avail himself of the broader waiver provision of the sue-and-be-sued clause, rather than
relying on the narrow constrictions of the FTCA. The FCA is the exclusive remedy for all
claims which are "cognizable" under its waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1994). This means that any suit found to be cognizable under the statute must be against
the government as a whole and not against the particular agency. Congress so mandated
in order to place the tort liability of those agencies with sue-and-be-sued clauses on the
same footing as those without. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486
U.S. 549, 562 (1988)). Claims to be cognizable under the FTCA must arise "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b). Because a private person could not be liable for a violation of the Constitution,
and because the "law of the place" refers to state substantive law, the Court found that a
constitutional tort is not cognizable under the FTCA. The Supreme Court thus held that
the sue-and-be-sued clause was not supplanted by the F'CA, allowed the plaintiff to sue the
FSLIC directly under the agency's sue-and-be-sued waiver of sovereign immunity. See 114
S. Ct. at 1002-03 (citing Federal Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940)).
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such torts committed in the employ of a private person would have given
rise to liability under state law."' 14 Because constitutional torts are based
on the federal Constitution, they are not cognizable under state law.115
Congress did not address governmental liability for constitutional vi-
olations at the time of the passage of the FTCA," 6 and congressional
attempts to waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts since the
Court created the cause of action in Bivens have failed. When Congress
recently amended the FTCA to substitute the United States as a defend-
ant in certain tort actions,117 it stated that the substitution "does not ex-
tend or apply to civil action against an employee of the Government
which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States.""18 It has been argued that the exclusion of constitutional torts
was merely a political accommodation," 9 but the fact remains that at-
114. 964 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1992).
115. Professor Davis has argued, on the other hand, that the term "law of the place"
should include the federal Constitution, as the Supremacy Clause declares the
Constitution to be "the supreme Law of the land," equally applicable in state as in federal
court. See Davis, supra note 12, at 49 (citing U.S. Const. art. VI).
116. In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27 (1953), the Court quoted FTCA
legislative history for the proposition that it was "not 'intended that the constitutionality of
legislation [or] the legality of regulations ... be tested through the medium of a damage
suit for tort.'" The Court cited this legislative history to underscore the fear that policy
choices would be challenged under the guise of a tort action. The concept of the
constitutional tort could not have been considered by Congress when it passed the FTCA
in 1946, as the earliest opinion recognizing a damage remedy under the Constitution was
not handed down until a decade and a half later, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
See supra note 22.
117. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Star. 4563 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (1994)).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2) (A) (1994). Congress was responding to the Supreme
Court's 1988 decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988), which held that a federal
employee enjoys personal immunity from state law tort actions only where the act allegedly
causing harm was discretionary and within the line of duty. See id. at 300. The 1988 Act
restored what Congress perceived to be the status quo prior to Westfal. See Clark Byse,
Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law: Damage Actions Against the
Government or Government Employees, 4 Admin. LJ. 275, 282-84 (1990) (describing
Westfali and the congressional response to the decision).
119. Byse argues that the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Judiciary Committee, in considering the bill to overturn Westfa!/,
made a political decision to avoid disputes between the Justice Department and civil
liberties organizations. See Byse, supra note 118, at 286-87. In order to avoid this political
quagmire, the then-chairperson of the Subcommittee, Representative Barney Frank, D-
Mass., sought a bill that would specifically exclude constitutional torts. The Committee's
decision to avoid constitutional torts, then, was not a question of a deliberated choice to
retain sovereign immunity for constitutional violations, but rather a reflection of legislative
expediency. One could infer congressional intent to preclude constitutional torts from an
affirmative act by Congress to bar such an action, but the inability to muster a majority to
overcome the default presumption is not dispositive.
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tempts to bring constitutional violations within the ambit of the FTCA
have been unsuccessful. 120
C. Supreme Court Arguments in Defense of Sovereign Immunity for
Constitutional Torts
Given the limits of Bivens and the failure of Congress to waive the
sovereign immunity of the federal government for constitutional torts,
plaintiffs have turned to the courts to create a cause of action against the
government. 21 Courts have rejected this possibility, but have been terse
in explaining the policies underlying their restraint. The Supreme Court
rarely discusses its rationale for protecting the prerogative of Congress in
deciding when to allow a suit against the federal government. Rather, the
Court adheres to a few simple canons of interpretation. 122 In FDIC v.
Meyer, however, the Court for the first time addressed a constitutional
claim seeking a damage remedy against the United States, and the rea-
sons it gave for not creating a cause of action provide insight into its
unwillingness to challenge sovereign immunity.123
The plaintiff in Meyer alleged that his employment had been termi-
nated without due process of law and sought damages under the Fifth
120. In 1982, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended that
Congress should enact legislation providing that the United States shall be
substitu.ted as the exclusive party defendant in all actions for damages for
violations of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States committed by
Federal executive branch officers and employees while acting within the scope of
their office or employment.
Administrative Conference of the United States, Federal Officials' Liability for
Constitutional Violations (recommendation no. 82-6), 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-6 (1989); Byse,
supra note 118, at 284. Despite this recommendation, and the volume of academic
literature supporting the removal of sovereign immunity for constitutional violations,
Congress has failed to act. See ThomasJ. Madden et al., Bedtime for Bivens: Substituting
the United States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 469
('1983) (considering congressional attempts to amend the FICA to allow for constitutional
tort claims against the federal government).
121. See supra note 19 for examples of such cases.
122. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
123. 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994). Meyer involved two inquiries by the Court: first, did the
agency's sue-and-be-sued clause waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, and, if
so, should there be a cause of action against the agency for constitutional violations?
Having answered the first question in the affirmative, the next question became one
entirely at the discretion of the Court. In other words, sovereign immunity had been
waived, and the only question was whether it was appropriate for the Court, as it had done
against individual officers in Bivens, to create a cause of action. The Court decided not to
create a cause of action, thereby reinstating the immunity it had just decided had been
waived. See id. at 1005. So, while the Court did not face the question of Whether to
abrogate sovereign immunity directly, in deciding to forego the opportunity to create a
cause of action for a constitutional violation, it laid out a concise argument for leaving
questions of liability to Congress. In essence the Court restated the modem law of
sovereign immunity, and the policy arguments the Court articulated for judicial restraint
bear directly on the debate over judicially abrogating sovereign immunity. See infra Part
I.
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Amendment.124 Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, relied
on two policy arguments to defeat such a cause of action. First, he argued
that creating a remedy against the United States "would mean the eviscer-
ation of the Bivens remedy" 25 because such a cause of action would un-
dermine the incentive for an aggrieved plaintiff to sue the offending offi-
cial. 126 The Court reasoned that any remedy against the United States
would instead create an incentive to reach the deep pockets of the fed-
eral government. Federal officials would then essentially have nothing to
fear in terms of personal liability. The deterrent effects of Bivens would
thus be undermined.127
Next, the Court found the potential expense of liability a "special
factor[] counselling hesitation." 128 "If we were to recognize a direct ac-
tion for damages against federal agencies," the Court argued, "we would
be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Gov-
ernment,"' 2 9 both in terms of actual liability and in the cost of defending
such claims. The Court concluded by stating that it was the exclusive
province of Congress to decide whether to embark on such a potentially
significant expansion of governmental liability.' 3 0 The Court noted that
Congress had tried several times to create such a cause of action, but
124. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 999. The plaintiff in Meler argued for a cause of action
against the government for actions arising out of the supervision of the Fidelity Savings and
Loan Association, a California-chartered thrift institution. See id. The plaintiff, a senior
Fidelity officer, was terminated pursuant to an FSLIC policy of removing the senior
management of savings and loan institutions placed into receivership under federal law.
See id.
125. Id. at 1005.
126. See id.
127. This rationale can be questioned on the practical ground that enterprise liability
may have a greater deterrent effect than individual liability, even for government entities.
See Schuck, supra note 22, at 102-06 (arguing that expanded governmental liability would
increase general deterrence by focusing incentives on the location best able to respond to
them). Furthermore, the Court's argument in Meyer about individual deterrence seriously
misstates the purpose of Bivens, which focused on compensation more than the deterrent
effects of personal liability. See Bandes, supra note 12, at 340-41 & n.244. Moreover, the
current structure of liability for officials but immunity for the government for
constitutional violations has other negative consequences. Professors Davis and Pierce
note that sympathy for the plight of public employees leads to narrow interpretations of
constitutional provisions, and leads juries to resolve close factual suits in favor of the
defendant. See Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn & Byse's Administrative Law:. Cases and
Comments 1280 (9th ed. 1995) [hereinafter Gellhorn & Byse] (citing Kenneth C. Davis &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 19.2, at 205-06 (1994)).
128. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
129. Id. at 1006.
130. See id.; see alsojaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) ("Any decision on whether claims of the plaintiffs should be
converted to a cause of action, however, should be reserved for Congress to make in these
special circumstances. It is that body which must weigh the competing priorities and policy
judgments to determine whether a cause of action should be created.").
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failed. 131 Viewing this in terms of constitutional separation of powers,
the Supreme Court can be seen as arguing that questions of the scope of
liability are reserved for the accountable branch, and not for unaccounta-
ble, unelected judges. 132
II. THE HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS As CONSTITUTIONAL
MASS TORTS
The Human Radiation Experiments provide insights into the
problems created by sovereign immunity. This Part first examines the
history of the HRE, and the variety of ways in which the program violated
fundamental rights.133 It then distinguishes these violations from most
constitutional torts by analogizing the HRE to mass torts, thus focusing
on the responsibility of the government as a whole.
A. The History of the Human Radiation Experiments
The Human Radiation Experiments began in 1944 as an effort by the
Manhattan Project, the federal government's World War II program to
build an atomic weapon,'3 to understand the effects of radioactive
materials on workers.' 35 Since the 1920s, the scientific community had
recognized radium as a dangerous substance, understood to be responsi-
ble for the high incidence of bone disease observed among radium dial
painters.136 It was unclear whether the materials the Manhattan Project
131. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1006 n.11 (citing H.R. 440, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
H.R. 595, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1775, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2659,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
182. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
1529, 1534-35 (1992) (arguing that separation of powers rationales for sovereign
immunity protect majoritarian policy decisions from review by unaccountable judges).
133. Determining whether these constitutional violations give rise to damage claims is
no easy inquiry. As Professor Davis has noted, the question of which violations of the
Constitution merit a damage remedy "has no single answer, for it is governed by no single
principle." See Davis, supra note 12, at 219. The bulk of constitutional tort claims arise
under § 1983, and not under Bivens, and the inconsistency of the doctrine may be
attributable to the vast array of situations in which § 1983 claims are filed. See id. at
213-14. For an in-depth discussion of human radiation experimentation as constitutional
tort, see Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site, and
Judgment at Nuremberg, 31 Gonz. L. Rev. 147 (1995/96).
134. See generally Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986). In
1942, the Manhattan Engineering District was created to develop the atomic bomb, with
facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Hanford, Washington, and Los Alamos, New Mexico,
where the weapon was eventually built. University of Rochester radiologist Stafford
Warren was appointed medical director of the Manhattan Project, and it was the medical
team that first made plans for human radiation testing. See Advisory Comm. Final Report,
supra note 3, at 25-26.
135. See Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 26.
136. See id. at 23. Painters of watch-dials used radium for its phosphorescence.
Typically, as they painted, they dabbed their brushes on their tongues. After many
developed blood disease and painful deterioration of the jaw, the danger of radioactive
materials became widely known. See id.
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was using would have similar effects, and so the Project's medical team
made plans to inject plutonium, polonium, uranium, and possibly other
radioactive materials into human subjects.' 3 7
After World War II, control of the nation's nuclear program shifted
to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established in 1946 by
the McMahon Act.138 The AEC established a Division of Biology and
Medicine, which had responsibility for biomedical research involving
atomic energy.13 9 The AEC sponsored a great variety of experiments well
into the 1970s, and a large, secret bureaucracy grew up around the evalu-
ation of the effects of radiation on human beings. 140 This bureaucracy
continued in one form or another for almost four decades, until 1974.141
The facts alleged in recently filed cases illustrate the scope and na-
ture of the experiments. In In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, the plain-
tiffs allege that from 1960 to 1972 experiments were conducted under the
auspices of the Department of Defense Atomic Support Agency at two
hospitals in Cincinnati, Ohio.142 Defendants exposed the subjects-ordi-
nary patients-to total or partial body irradiation in order" 'to develop a
baseline for determining how much radiation exposure was too much,
... to determine how shielding could decrease the deleterious effect of
the radiation,'" and to determine what effect radiation had on " 'cogni-
tive or other functions mediated through the central nervous system.' "143
Each subject, although suffering from cancer, was deemed to be in good
clinical condition. 4 4 Plaintiffs further allege that subjects were selected
because they were indigent, poorly educated or of below-average intelli-
gence, and that the majority were African-American. 145 Patients were
told they were receiving treatment, but the primary effects of the expo-
sure appear to have been seriously shortened life expectancy, bone mar-
row failure or suppression, nausea, vomiting, burns on the subjects' bod-
137. See id. at 28.
138. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1994)); Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3,
at 30.
139. See Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 30. The AEC also created an
Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, reporting directly to the chairman. See id.
140. See id. at 32-33.
141. In 1974, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued rules for
the protection of human subjects of federally sponsored research. See id. at 5. The
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments limited its inquiry, then, to
incidents that occurred between 1944 and 1974, and this Note assumes that the bulk of the
experimentation occurred during that period of time. For a discussion of the size and
scope of the Human Radiation Experiments, see infra text accompanying notes 191-197.
142. 874 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D. Ohio 1995). The case was initially decided on
motions to dismiss, see id. at 801, and as such, the factual allegations of the plaintiff were
assumed to be true. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
143. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 803 (quoting a report prepared by
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ies, severe and permanent pain, and emotional distress.' 46 No consent
was garnered from any subject for the first five years of the trial, and
thereafter consent was sought without giving the subjects information
about the real risks involved.' 47
In Shattuck v. MIT, 48 former involuntary residents at the Walter E.
Fernald State School in Waltham, Massachusetts allege that they were the
victims of experiments in the 1940s and 1950s using radioactive isotopes
fed to them without their knowledge. 149 The victims, retarded minors in
the care of the state, were recruited to participate in the experiments
under the guise of a "Science Club" and were told that they were advanc-
ing the cause of science without being told the particulars of the experi-
ment.' 50 Scientists enticed the subjects into the experiments with re-
wards like Mickey Mouse watches, Christmas parties, and trips to baseball
games.15 1 The AEC allegedly allowed additional doses of radioactive ma-
terial to be administered to more severely handicapped children, those
deemed "mentally deficient.' 5
2
Finally, in Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest Research Foundation,'53 former
inmates at the Oregon State Penitentiary in Salem, Oregon allege that
from 1963 to 1973, officials working under the auspices of the AEC sub-
jected them to X-ray irradiation of the testes and follow-up invasive sur-
gery.'5 4 The tests were meant to investigate the effects of ionizing radia-
tion on spermatogenesis in employees of nuclear weapons facilities after
an accident in April 1962 at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Rich-
land, Washington.1 5 The government was also concerned about the ef-
fects of ionizing radiation on astronauts and/or pilots of a proposed
nuclear-powered airplane.'
56
B. Violations of the Constitution by the Human Radiation Experiments
Plaintiffs in these cases assert a number of constitutional claims, par-
ticularly arising out of due process, equal protection, and the right under
the Eighth Amendment of prisoners to be free of cruel and unusual pun-
146. See id. at 804.
147. See id. at 803-04.
148. No. 95-12605 (D. Mass. filed Dec. 18, 1995).
149. See Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 15-21, Shattuck (No. 95-
12605) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Shattuck Class Action
Complaint].
150. See id. at 17.
151. See id. at 21.
152. See id. at 20.
153. No. 95-06410-HO (D. Or. filed Dec. 4, 1995).
154. See Class Action Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 2, 5, 14, .Bibeau (No.
95-06410-HO) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Bibeau Class Action
Complaint].
155. See id. at 13.
156. See id; Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 421 (describing pilots' fear
of testicular damage from a proposed atomic plane as a motivation for experiments on the
exposure of testes to radiation).
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ishment. The alleged facts of the particular cases yield slightly different
constitutional analyses, but several themes are consistent. Plaintiffs assert
that the government cannot constitutionally use unconsenting civilians as
guinea pigs.157 Moreover, the fact that victims may have been drawn
from vulnerable populations like state prisoners' 5 8 and indigent or mi-
nority hospital patients' 59 raises equal protection concerns. Finally,
plaintiffs have raised a number of procedural due process claims arising
from the secrecy surrounding the projects, and the fact that such secrecy
denied them the right to pursue state law claims. 160 Together these con-
stitutional claims represent assertions that federal officials overstepped
the bounds of their limited authority and used victims as means to ends
without their full knowledge or consent.
The claims addressed by the court in In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litigation'6 ' are illustrative.162 First, and most compellingly, the Court
157. See, e.g., Shattuck Class Action Complaint, supra note 149, at 1-2, 4 (describing
plaintiffs as "human guinea pigs in a series of dangerous, coercive, painful and unproven
experiments" and asserting that the "defendants' actions were in violation of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution").
158. See Bibeau Class Action Complaint, supra note 154, 'at 5-6 (asserting that all
victims in one class were prisoners and wards of the State of Oregon).
159. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(discussing assertion of plaintiffs that subjects of radiation experiments were intentionally
drawn from African-American patients).
160. See, e.g., Bibeau Class Action Complaint, supra note 154, at 33-34 (alleging that
the defendants, by concealing and/or destroying information, deprived plaintiffs of their
property rights without due process and their right of access to the courts).
161. 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
162. These claims were analyzed in the process of determining whether defendants
could assert qualified immunity as a defense to § 1983 and Bivens charges. Finding their
actions clearly unconstitutional, the court held that the defendants could not assert
qualified immunity. See id. at 814. The court further relied on the argument that an
official can only garner immunity for acting within the scope of delegated authority, and
found that "instigation of and participation in the Human Radiation Experiments were
acts far beyond the scope of their delegated powers." Id.
Judge Beckwith also discussed the relevance of the Nuremberg Code to the asserted
immunity of the defendants. See id. at 820. The Nuremberg Code, established in the
Medical Case at Nuernberg, United States v. Brandt, 1 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals 1, Vol. 2 at 181-82 (1947), contained ten principles to guide
medical experimentation, the first of which was that the "voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential." Id. Judge Beckwith's opinion relied on justice O'Connor's
partial dissent in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987), a case involving LSD
experiments conducted by the Army on unwitting enlisted men. There, the plaintiff's
claim was barred by the fact that it had occurred in the course of military service. Judge
Beckwith reasoned that because the victims of the Cincinnati radiation experiments were
not in the military (and because Stanley had been a 5-4 decision), Justice O'Connor's
partial dissent should control. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 821 n.23.
Justice O'Connor had written:
The United States military played an instrumental role in the criminal
prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented with human subjects during the
Second World War ... and the standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
developed to judge the behavior of the defendants stated that the "voluntary
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found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a violation of the substan-
tive due process right to bodily integrity to survive a qualified immunity
defense. 163 In answer to the defendants' argument that the subjects had
been voluntary patients, the court countered that many of the patients, as
indigents, had access only to the hospital where the experiments were
taking place and were never informed of the nature of the experiments
or their attendant risks.'6 4 Finally, the court discussed the long line of
cases finding a liberty interest in refusing state-sponsored invasive medi-
cal procedures. 165 The court had little difficulty in finding a violation of
the plaintiffs' liberty interest, with no state interest sufficiently compelling
to overcome the claim.1 66
Next the Court addressed the alleged denial of the right to access to
courts.' 67 Defendants, by intentionally concealing the true nature and
risks of the experiments, and keeping them secret until press reports re-
leased more than twenty years after their completion, "substantially com-
promised" any potential state law claims arising out of them.'68 For the
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential... to satisfy moral, ethical
and legal concepts."... If this principle is violated the very least that society can
do is to see that the victims are compensated, as best they can be, by the
perpetrators. I am prepared to say that our Constitution's promise of due process
of law guarantees this much.
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 710 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
the Medical Case at Nuernberg, United States v. Brandt, supra).
ForJudge Beckwith, the Nuremberg Code's mandate of consent for experimentation,
if not controlling precedent in the United States, at least indicated that the defendants
should have understood that their actions were unacceptable by prevailing standards of
official conduct. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 821-22. For a
discussion of the history and development of the Nuremberg Code, see generally The Nazi
Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation (GeorgeJ.
Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). For a discussion of the role of the Nuremberg
Code in the courts of the United States, see GeorgeJ. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The
Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 17 (1991).
163. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 810 (citing Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986))); see also Morris L Hawke, Comment, The "Kingdom of Ends": In Re Cincinnati
Radiation Litigation and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 977, 984-90
(1995) (discussingJudge Beckwith's analysis of the substantive due process right to bodily
integrity).
164. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 811-12.
165. See id. at 812 (citing cases).
166. The court compared unconsented-to nontherapeutic radiation experiments to
various liberty interest claims that had failed because sufficiently compelling state interests
justified the procedures, and found no such sufficient countervailing state interest in this
case. See id. at 813 (citing "compulsory vaccinations, compelled blood tests, and
extractions of contraband... from the rectal cavity" as physical invasions that have been
upheld on a showing of "clear necessity, procedural regularity, and minimal pain").
167. See id. at 822-23 (citing Chambers v. Baltimore, 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)
(discussing right to access to courts under Article IV of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment) and Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (discussing right to
access to court found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)).
168. Id. at 823-24.
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court, this was sufficient to support a cause of action. 169 The plaintiffs
also asserted a related procedural due process claim, under the theory
that the concealment of the experiments impaired their ability to pursue
a wrongful death claim under Ohio law, which requires that such claims
be commenced within two years after the decedent's death.170 Again, the
court found merit in their claim, noting that the Supreme Court has af-
firmed that "a cause of action is a species of property protected by the ...
Due Process Clause.' 71
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted an equal protection claim, pointing to
the fact that the majority of subjects were African-American. 172 The court
found that the allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,
although it noted that there were significant factual issues in contention
about the defendants' knowledge and intent with regard to the recruit-
ment of subjects.' 73
HRE cases that have not yet proceeded to trial present other consti-
tutional claims. The plaintiffs in Bibeau, prisoners whose testes were ex-
posed to radiation, assert a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 174 In Mousso v. University of
Rochester,175 plaintiffs, subjects of plutonium injections at the University of
Rochester, assert a creative claim for violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a
more traditional claim for violation of the right to privacy.176 It is unclear
how these claims will fare in court. On a fundamental level, however, the
practice of secretly experimenting on unconsenting subjects represents
governmental action that violates the Constitution.
C. Defining Constitutional Mass Torts
If, as just explored, the Human Radiation Experiments are constitu-
tional torts, they can reveal much about the limitations of the current
regime of sovereign immunity for such violations. Typical Bivens claims
arise out of the individual actions of federal officials, and therefore re-
semble traditional common law torts.177 Governmental activity like the
169. See id. at 824.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 825 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
172. See id. at 828-29. Equal Protection violations were also at issue in the Tuskegee
Syphilis Experiments, where a government study subjected several hundred African-
American men to syphilis without treatment. See James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment 1, 216-17 (1993) (describing the case filed as a result of the
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments and the subsequent out-of-court settlement).
173. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 828-29.
174. See Bibeau Class Action Complaint, supra note 154, at 2, 30.
175. No. 95-CV-6288T (W.D.N.Y. filedJune 16, 1995).
176. See Complaint forJury Demand, at 53, Mousso (No. 95-CV-6288T) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
177. For a discussion of the development of constitutional torts by analogy to
common law torts, see supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
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HRE, however, calls for a type of liability that is closer to that imposed in
mass tort situations. Individual officers have the ability to hide behind
the facade of a massive bureaucracy and to shield their actions from dis-
closure for decades. In such a situation, courts should focus on the insti-
tutional responsibility of the government as a whole, and not on the ac-
tions of the particular officers who implemented the policy. This section
will discuss the shift in the law of torts from liability that derives from
individual action to liability that arises from the actions of large institu-
tions, and argue that a policy such as the HRE produces constitutional
torts that are much more akin to mass torts and as such are appropriately
resolved by the imposition of institutional liability. This section will con-
sider the development of the law of mass torts as a species of liability
distinct from traditional common law torts. It will then lay out the salient
characteristics of the HRE as a constitutional mass tort.
1. Torts and Mass Torts. - Paradigmatic tort cases involve individual
plaintiffs suing individual defendants, seeking compensation for the inva-
sion of their rights.178 In the last several decades, courts have been in-
creasingly confronted with injuries that arise out of institutional conduct
affecting vast numbers of plaintiffs, in actions that are described as "mass
torts."179 Mass torts arise frequently in product liability cases, °80 and the
exposure of large populations to toxic substances is increasingly a source
of liability.' 8 ' Courts have struggled to meet the traditional tort goal of
compensation in situations where causation is unclear and the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the defendant hard to demonstrate.' 8 2
Some cases present issues of indeterminate defendants, where it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine which of the wrongdoers before the
court caused the specific harm to the plaintiff, even when the nature of
the harm is clear.'83 Conversely, mass torts sometimes involve indetermi-
nate plaintiffs, where it is unclear exactly who in a population has been
178. Traditional tort law encompasses both intentional violations of the rights of
another as well as harm arising out of negligence. The elements of a common law tort
include a duty-e.g., the duty of care-that is breached, causing injury where the causal
link between that violation and the injury is legally cognizable. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ SA, 9, 281, 282, 430, 431 (1965); Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on
Torts, 731-71 (5th ed. 1990).
179. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in
the Courts (1986);Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect
of Class Actions, Consolidations, and Other Multiparty Devices (1995).
180. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.) (mass tort case arising out of
the use of diethylstilbesterol (DES), a drug that prevents miscarriage), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
181. See Susan Hansen, Money for Nothing?, Am. Law., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 60-69
(describing mass tort litigation arising from release of sulfuric acid in Richmond,
California and discussing similar cases).
182. See Weinstein, supra note 179, at 18-19.
183. See Kenneth R. Feinberg &Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Torts: Cases and Materials 2-
28 to 2-103 (1995) (discussing problems related to indeterminate defendants and plaintiffs
in mass torts).
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injured by the actions of the defendants, even when it is clear that the
defendants have caused harm.18 4
Courts faced with mass torts have significantly altered traditional
conceptions of tort liability with theories such as enterprise and market
share liability, which focus on the role that institutions play in creating
wide-scale injuries. 185 Instead of inquiring into whether the plaintiff's
injuries are directly attributable to a given defendant, courts look to the
role the defendant played in marketing a product and exposing consum-
ers to its risks. 86 Moreover, courts faced with mass torts relax traditional
notions of causation, which require the plaintiff to prove that the particu-
lar defendant was more likely than not to have caused the particular in-
jury. In mass tort cases, which often arise out of exposure to toxic or
carcinogenic substances,' 8 7 injuries may manifest themselves years or de-
cades after exposure, and can often be difficult to disaggregate from the
background incidence of the disease without exposure.'8 8
2. Defining Characteristics of the Human Radiation Experiments as Consti-
tutional Mass Tort. - Unlike most constitutional torts, which fit neatly
within the framework of traditional individual-to-individual liability,' 89
the Human Radiation Experiments present claims that more closely re-
semble mass torts. Consequently, the institutional focus that has devel-
oped in mass tort law provides a useful way of analyzing the salient char-
acteristics of these "constitutional mass torts."'
9 0
First, and foremost, the HRE was initiated and maintained as part of
a long-standing and far-reaching policy of government-sponsored experi-
mentation on human beings, and was not the product of the individual
action of a single official.' 91 The initial decision to begin experimenta-
184. See id.
185. See Weinstein, supra note 179, at 148-54.
186. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal.) (establishing
liability based on market share for product liability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. App. Div.) (developing market
share liability based on national market), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
187. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(exposure to asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
188. This is not true in those cases where exposure leaves a "signature" illness, like
mesothelioma, which arises out of exposure to asbestos. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Even in those cases, however,
victims may have suffered multiple exposures or been at risk for other reasons, such as
smoking.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
190. The term "constitutional mass torts" used in this Note is not meant to imply a
direct parallel to the law of mass torts in terms of issues such as the exact scope of
enterprise liability or theories of compensable injuries, e.g., increased risk of disease or
diminution in quality of life, that have arisen out of mass tort litigation. See Weinstein,
supra note 179, at 152-54. Rather, the analogy to mass torts primarily serves to shift the
focus of the debate about sovereign liability from individual wrongdoers to institutional
actions, in the same way that the traditional focus of the law of torts has shifted for mass
torts.
191. See Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 22-42.
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tion was made by the advisory board to the Manhattan Project' 92 after
consultation with scientists, military officials, and doctors.193 After the
completion of the Manhattan Project, the experiments were continued by
the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission, which eventually became
the Department of Energy.' 94 Other experiments involved the Depart-
ment of Defense and the predecessor to the Department of Health and
Human Services, and may have implicated the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency.' 95
Not only was the program large in terms of the number of agencies
involved, it was also long-lasting, continuing for thirty years and spanning
six presidential administrations. Moreover, the experiments were not re-
stricted to one facility. Instead, they took place at universities and hospi-
tals all over the country, including the Universities of Rochester, Chicago
and California, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.196 More
than 2000 human radiation experiments were conducted at Veterans'
Administration facilities, in conjunction with neighboring medical
schools. 197 In terms of the magnitude of the violation, the FIRE were
truly mass in scale.
Next, the HRE were conducted in total secrecy. As a matter of na-
tional security, all information about the enterprise was classified, and
even congressional attempts to secure the release of data proved fruit-
less.' 98 In fact, when the first experiments were conducted using pluto-
nium, the word plutonium itself was still classified. 199 The total secrecy
surrounding the project effectively prevented any public discourse about
the policy and circumvented the normal machinery of political accounta-
bility.200 Moreover, this secrecy operated to complicate the identification
of causal links between individual plaintiffs and particular responsible of-
192. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
193. See Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 25-29.
194. See id.
195. See Exec. Order No. 12,891, 3 C.FR. 847 (1995) (creating the Human Radiation
Interagency Working Group, which includes the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, Health
and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs, the Attorney General, the Administrator of
NASA, the Director of the CIA, and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget).
196. See Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 28-29.
197. See id. at 32.
198. In 1984, Representative Edward J. Markey, D-Mass., began a two-year
investigation into reports of human experimentation to gauge the effects of radiation. The
Department of Energy refused to release classified information, and the final report issued
in 1986 was only able to uncover 31 experiments of the several thousand that have now
been revealed. See House Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power, House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three
Decades of Radiation Experiments on U.S. Citizens 111 (Subcomm. Print 1986).
199. See Schroeter, supra note 133, at 158.
200. This secrecy, beyond the practical difficulties created for plaintiffs, indicates a
significant breakdown in the normal mechanisms of accountability underlying rationales
for judicial restraint. See infra text accompanying notes 266-278.
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ficials, in much the same way that indeterminacy in mass tort cases makes
traditional causal connections difficult.2 0 1
Finally, the type of policy at issue involved complex technical and
scientific issues, not easily analogized to common law torts.20 2 In some
cases, where records have not been destroyed or lost or the victims are
otherwise easily identifiable, it is possible to trace the wrongdoing to an
individual doctor or official. 203 Nevertheless, there are instances in the
HRE, such as open air releases of radiation,20 4 in which the kinds of
difficult questions of latency and multiple causation that drive the mod-
em law of substantive liability in the context of mass torts will
predominate.2 0 5 Moreover, the clandestine nature of the program, and
the fact that it was kept hidden for so long, contribute to the difficulty of
linking individual victims to individual wrongdoers. This indeterminacy
strains the analogy between traditional tort liability that underlies most
Bivens cases and the constitutional violations represented by the HRE. In
sum, all of these characteristics underscore the fact that the HRE repre-
sented institutional action, carried out over the span of decades, with the
201. Judge Weinstein offers an evaluative scheme of mass torts based on three axes:
the clarity of the causal connection between the plaintiff and the defendant, whether the
incident was part of a single event or multiple events, and whether the injuries were
proximate in time and place. See Weinstein, supra note 179, at 15-19. The federal
government's secrecy arguably shifted how one would characterize the IRE on two of
Judge Weinstein's three axes, in that it obscured the identity of some defendants and hid
the proximity of the injuries for decades. Both of these shifts complicate the judicial task
of determining liability.
202. At the same time, however, some individual experiments do parallel certain
traditional torts. Certainly the act of an individual scientist injecting plutonium into an
individual subject without consent has an element of the traditional tort of battery. Mass
torts, however, can arise out of the aggregation of what would otherwise be individual torts.
See, e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.) (mass tort case arising from
collapse of a skywalk in a Kansas City hotel), vacated, remanded, 680 F.2d 1175, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). In other words, in the common law context, what is different
about a mass tort can simply be a factor of scale.
It should also be noted that the FTCA does not waive the sovereign immunity of the
federal government for many intentional torts, including battery. See supra note 106. It is
for this reason that it is important to consider the constitutional violations, and notjust the
traditional torts, that arose out of the HRE. As a matter of practice, the Court will strive to
avoid constitutional questions if an issue before it can be resolved in any other way. See,
e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 472 (1994) (noting the canon
of construction that statutes will be construed to avoid constitutional questions); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991) (same). In instances where the actions of
government officials can be characterized as common law torts and violations of the
constitution, this traditional canon would tie the vindication of all tort-like constitutional
protections to the scope of the parallel common law action.
208. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
204. See generally Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 506-46 (detailing
what is now known about intentional releases of radioactivity).
205. For a discussion of issues of technical complexity and the related concerns of
latency and multiple causation, see Weinstein, supra note 179, at 18-19.
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full resources of the federal government. In the context of such a policy,
sovereign immunity should be reexamined.
III. PROPOSAL: JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL MASS TORTS
The Human Radiation Experiments illustrate the limits created by
Congress's retention of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts and
the Court's reluctance to create a cause of action against the federal gov-
ernment in such cases. Courts presented with arguments for abrogating
sovereign immunity refuse to open the lid of a potential Pandora's box of
liability, but in so doing bar recovery in those cases where it is truly appro-
priate. In most Bivens actions, where individual officers violate the rights
of a few victims, such caution has merit. Constitutional mass torts, how-
ever, as exemplified by the HRE, present claims in which the rationales
that underlie judicial restraint are less compelling. This Part will discuss
the necessity ofjudicial action in the absence of a response by the polit-
ical branches to constitutional violations. It will then discuss the power of
the court to create a remedy in this context. Finally, it will lay out criteria
based on the facts of the HRE to define a distinct and narrow category of
cases in which the Court can create an exception to its all-or-nothing ap-
proach to sovereign immunity.
A. The Absence of a Remedy from the Political Process
Congress has the power to compensate the victims of the Human
Radiation Experiments, as it has done for the victims of some mass
torts,20 6 or it could waive sovereign immunity in this instance and allow
suits against the United States to go forward.207 The HRE, however, have
not yet generated widespread calls for congressional action;208 this may
be attributable to the fact that the experiments occurred decades ago and
206. See id. at 123 (listing government programs for black lung, atomic energy, and
vaccines). But see id. at 163 (arguing that an administrative remedy for mass torts, in the
absence of a strong independent bar and bench, often deteriorates due to lack of funds or
capture by specific economic interests). It should be noted that the Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1994), the government's atomic energy compensation plan, is at issue in
some of the suits arising out of the HRE. The Price-Anderson Act indemnifies contractors
for "nuclear incidents." 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) (1994). Claims that the Price-Anderson Act
should apply to the BE were rejected by Judge Beckwith in In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litig, 874 F. Supp. at 830-32. Congress has acted in the realm of open-air nuclear testing
to provide some administrative remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2212 (1994).
207. Congress, for example, waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for
constitutional violations arising out of certain categories of intentional torts committed by
federal investigative or law enforcement officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994).
208. As of yet, only one bill has been submitted on the Human Radiation
Experiments, and it does not have bipartisan support. On October 11, 1995,
Representative Martin Frost, D-Tex., submitted H.R. 2463, the Radiation Experimentation
Compensation Act of 1995, that would compensate fewer than fifty victims, with $50,000
and an official apology. See H.R. 2463, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(c), 3(e), 4(a) (1995). It
is possible that as victims and their advocates become more organized, more political
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involved victims who may not yet realize that they were subjected to ex-
perimentation, or may have since died.2 0 9
In approaching claims for recognizing a Bivens cause of action, the
Court gives great weight to the existence and adequacy of remedial
schemes created by the political branches.2 1 0 This deference is animated
by concern that judicially-created remedies might interfere with spheres
of congressional authority and existing, carefully crafted, remedial
schemes.2 1 ' In the context ofjudicial abrogation of sovereign immunity,
the fact that the political branches have not provided a remedy supports
judicial intervention, and allays concerns about interfering with existing
remedial schemes.2 12 If Congress or the executive branch responds to
the constitutional violations arising from the HRE, the need for judicial
abrogation of sovereign immunity would be obviated. As it stands, how-
ever, if the Court chooses to defer to the silence of the political branches,
the victims of the HRE will be left with no remedy against the
government.2 13
On a more fundamental level, relying on the political branches for a
remedy when constitutional torts have occurred leaves decisions about
the vindication of rights entirely to the very institutions that might have
violated them. The political process does yield remedies, 2 14 and where
the political process is functioning, such remedies will obviate the need
for judicial action. But the fact that remedies are sometimes provided is
not dispositive in those instances in which a remedy is not provided. As
pressure will prompt Congress to act. Telephone Interview with Susan McAvoy, Legislative
Director to Congressman Frost (Dec. 19, 1995).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 47-58.
211. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1988) (refusing to find a
cause of action because of existing remedial scheme). The Bivens "special factors," as they
have been applied in cases like Schweiker, might not translate directly into conditions that
should defeat the creation of a cause of action against the government, but they provide a
strong indication of the motivation of the Court in deferring to Congress.
212. When the Advisory Committee on the Human Radiation Experiments issued its
final report, President Clinton appeared on national television to apologize to the victims
on behalf of the United States government. He also pledged that a remedy would be
forthcoming. See Gary Lee, Clinton Apologizes for U.S. Radiation Tests, Praises Panel
Report, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1995, atA8. So far, however, no remedy has been offered. The
Task Force on Radiation and Human Rights, an advocacy organization representing HRE
victims, recently reported to Congress that the Clinton Administration "is not prepared to
even implement the Advisory Committee's meager recommendations." Human Radiation
Experiments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Mar. 12, 1996,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); Fed. Documents Clearing House, Inc., available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNEWS File (statement of Task Force on Radiation and Human
Rights).
213. In addition to their suits against individual officers, plaintiffs in HRE cases are
also suing private institutions who implemented government contracts. See supra note 8.
214. For example, after the Supreme Court decided that the FTCA did not waive
sovereign immunity for the policy choice that gave rise to the accidental leveling of a small
city in Texas, see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), Congress did pass a statute
providing compensation. See Texas City Disaster Act, ch. 864, 69 Stat. 707 (1955).
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Justice Harlan argued in Bivens, where it falls to the Court to stand be-
tween the failure of the political branches to vindicate constitutional
fights and leaving the victims of such violations without a remedy, the
Court should act.2 1 5
B. The Power of the Court to Modify Sovereign Immunity in the Absence of
Congressional Authorization
While there is an academic consensus that the Court has the power
to abrogate sovereign immunity, no federal court has exercised this
power.216 There are several questions raised by the assertion that the
Court can provide a remedy in damages for constitutional violations:
does the Court have the power to create a cause of action; does the Court
have the power to abrogate sovereign immunity; and, finally, can the
Court enforce any order for damages against a coordinate branch in the
absence of prior consent?
The initial question of the power of the Court to infer a cause of
action from the substantive protections of the Constitution arguably was
settled in Bivens.217 Although the Court did not create a cause of action
against the government, its holding that the Constitution can afford a
remedy in the absence of a statutory cause of action should apply regard-
less of whether the defendant is the government or a government official.
The judicial power to abrogate sovereign immunity, given the tenac-
ity of the doctrine, presents a more difficult question. It is perhaps too
simple to note that sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine, not
based on the text of the Constitution, and that constitutional authority
should be supreme over the common lawY' 8 While the text of the
Constitution may not mandate sovereign immunity, other constitutional
doctrines support it. The separation of powers doctrine, for example,
cautions that the Court should intrude as minimally as possible on the
coequal branches of the federal government.2 19 Ultimately, however, the
dispositive question is whether the Court is solely constrained by tradi-
215. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
216. See Bandes, supra note 12, at 299-322. Professor Davis notes that between 1957
and 1976, 29 states judicially abrogated state sovereign immunity for tort liability, strongly
suggesting that it is within the common law powers of a court to find exceptions to the
common law doctrine. See Davis, supra note 12, at 7-9 (citing as examples Lipman v.
Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 359 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1961); Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist.,
359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Ha. 1957)).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94; see also Dellinger, supra note 12, at
1556-57 (stating that courts are required to recognize remedies for federal violations of
constitutional rights despite the absence of a congressionally created cause of action).
219. See Krent, supra note 132, at 1534-35. It has been argued that a damage remedy
is less intrusive than normal forms of injunctive relief. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 14-16.
Certainly the traditional preference for legal remedies over equitable remedies, see supra
note 30, underscores the concept that providing damages interferes less with the parties
before the court.
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tion, and the answer appears to be that the Court is not bound under the
Constitution by more than stare decisis.220
Stare decisis is, of course, a strong factor weighing against judicial
action. The Supreme Court regularly construes sovereign immunity in
favor of the sovereign,22' and such consistency from the Court might rea-
sonably create the expectation in the political branches that the doctrine
will not suddenly, and significantly, shift. Moreover, as a practical matter,
the current sentiment of the Court is decidedly protective of the doc-
trine.222 Stare decisis, however, is not absolute, and should not control in
sufficiently compelling circumstances. 223
Finally, the Court's reluctance to create liability can be viewed as a
question of the power of the judiciary to enforce remedies against coordi-
nate branches. Setting aside for the moment the question of what con-
cerns should motivate the Court to overcome its prudential restraint, 224
an argument can be made that Congress should satisfy a Court-created
damage remedy against the United States if imposed to vindicate consti-
tutional rights.225 The Constitution mandates that no federal funds be
expended without explicit legislative authority.226 In certain circum-
220. Cf. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 23, 24-25 (1994) (laying out an argument against relying on precedent in
constitutional cases).
221. See supra note 98.
222. FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994), was a unanimous decision and other recent
cases addressing federal sovereign immunity have not produced split Courts. See, e.g.,
Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (no dissents); Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719
(1994) (same); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (same). Justice John Paul
Stevens has been a notable exception to the Court's stance on the subject, dissenting in
cases involving arguments in favor of narrowly construing sovereign immunity. See Nagle,
supra note 96, at 774 n.22, n.23 (citing as examples United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893,
1898 (1993) (Stevens,J., dissenting); Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 629 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 39 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 139 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); John P.
Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121 (1993) (discussing views on
sovereignty)).
223. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
224. See infra Part Ill.C.
225. Scholars have noted that the Appropriations Clause gives Congress the authority
to resist judicial mandates. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale I.J. 1343,
1351 n.34 (1988) (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290-91 (1850) and
National Ass'n of Regional Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1977) for the
proposition that "a court has no more constitutional authority than does the President to
mandate withdrawal from the Treasury"). It can be argued, however, that the
Appropriations Clause is not an absolute grant of power to Congress to control
expenditures, and Congress must comport with other constitutional mandates in any
refusal to appropriate.
226. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"); Stith, supra note 225, at 1348
(discussing the Appropriations Clause). But see Travis, supra note 12, at 658. Travis cites
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (plurality opinion), for the proposition that
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stances, however, the Constitution compels congressional spending, and
if the Court were to impose damages, under the authority of the Constitu-
tion, for a constitutional violation, Congress would have less latitude to
resist.227 It is debatable whether the Constitution's grant of the judicial
power in Article III should preempt the spending power granted to Con-
gress if the two conflict, but at least in such a situation Congress would be
required to resist explicitly a constitutional edict.2 28
The Court has never imposed a remedy on the United States in the
absence of congressional authorization because the traditional view of
sovereign immunity has allowed the Court to avoid the conflict. But if
the Article III judicial power includes the power to create damage reme-
dies,229 then theoretically any remedy created to vindicate constitutional
rights would obligate Congress to comply. Congress could refuse to act,
and the Court would have no recourse to compel it to do so,2 30 but in
such a case it would be clear that Congress was acting contrary to the
mandate of a constitutional decision. This is certainly a risk whenever the
Court orders the United States to fulfill any of its statutory or common
law obligations, but the fear of such defiance should not prevent the con-
templation of a remedy.23'
the Appropriations Clause is not an absolute limit on the federal judicial power. The
Supreme Court concluded in Glidden that "if ability to enforce judgments were made a
criterion ofjudicia power, no tribunal created under Article III would be able to assume
jurisdiction of money claims against the United States." 370 U.S. at 570. Certainly, as the
Court discussed in FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1005-06 (1994), the potential liability of
the United States is a strong factor counselling hesitation, but it is not a constitutional bar
to the creation of a remedy.
227. See Stith, supra note 225, at 1350-51 (noting that Congress must provide public
funds for constitutionally mandated activities and the independent constitutional activity
of the President). An example of this is found in the constitutional imperative that the
President "receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during the Period for. which he shall have been elected." U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 7. The Constitution, then, does not allow Congress to refuse to appropriate funds
for the President's salary.
228. The Court has long had the power to mandamus officers to make direct
payments from government funds, as long as the fiction was maintained that the suit was
against the officer for the injunction, rather than against the government in its sovereign
capacity. SeeJaffe, supra note 71, at 82. There is also an old tradition of suits by taxpayers
to force the return of excessive payments. See, e.g., Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
137 (1836).
229. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 395-96 (1971) (discussing the power of the federal courts to create remedies).
230. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 750
(1978) (discussing the limits of thejudicia power to compel the disbursement of funds.).
231. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 36 (noting that in many instances, beginning with
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court successfully has ordered
coordinate branches to comply with its exercise of the judicial power). It is beyond the
scope of this Note to more fully elaborate on the theoretical foundations of the power of
an Article Ili court to abrogate sovereign immunity. While this assertion is, admittedly, not
settled by currentjurisprudence, convincing arguments have been made elsewhere for this
power. See Bandes, supra note 12, at 299-302. The remainder of the discussion in this
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C. Parameters ofJudicial Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
Some commentators have advocated abrogating sovereign immunity
across the board.23 2 If sovereign immunity were eliminated for all consti-
tutional torts, or for those constitutional torts that involve official pol-
icy,233 the reservation of policynaking discretion crafted by Congress and
endorsed by the Supreme Court could be eviscerated. The Court's artic-
ulation of the need to avoid the perils of second-guessing the political
process is grounded in a healthy understanding of its limited role in a
tripartite system.234 The Court's all-or-nothing approach, however, fore-
closes an independentjudicial response to egregious abuses of power like
the HRE. A balance must be struck enabling the Court to move away
from its current position of uncritically protecting sovereign immunity
without sacrificing the respect for coordinate branches that underlies the
doctrine in the bulk of cases. Constitutional mass torts present a narrow
category of claims that are compelling enough for judicial abrogation,
but defined clearly enough to avoid the constitutionalization of all policy
disputes.
Experimenting on unwitting subjects in the HRE was clearly uncon-
stitutional at the time, and was conducted in secret on an institutional
level across the broad spectrum of government.23 5 When considered in
light of the rationales the Court has given for not creating a cause of
action against the United States, these characteristics present a compel-
ling argument in favor of abrogating sovereign immunity. This section
will discuss considerations that should serve as limiting principles to en-
Note, then, will proceed under the assumption that the choice courts make not to create a
cause of action against the government for constitutional violations is not constitutionally
mandated.
232. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 12, at 345-46. Bandes argues for what she calls a
"self-executing" Constitution, whereby the question of individual rights of action for
constitutional violations would be disconnected from the consent of the political branches.
Her argument has force, but sweeps quite broadly. She advocates, for example, judicial
review of the adequacy of remedies provided by the political branches. Given the extreme
caution of the Court in treading on the prerogatives of the political branches and given the
legitimate fear of constitutionalizing policy disputes, it is more appropriate to propose
judicial intervention in a narrow category of cases where the balance between the duty of
the Court to provide substantive meaning to constitutional protections outweighs the need
to respect coordinate branches that underlies current sovereign immunity doctrine.
233. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 12, at 667 ("[T]he Court's 'responsibility to assure
the vindication of constitutional interests' is even greater when the injury is caused by
unconstitutional government action." (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring))). For further
discussion, see infra note 243. By contrast, a constitutional tort that did not involve policy
would arise from the actions of individual officials acting on their own initiative. Where,
for example, a federal agent decides to search a criminal suspect's home without a proper
warrant, such search might violate the Fourth Amendment, but not necessarily indicate
any larger policy of warrantless searches.
234. See Krent, supra note 132, at 1534-41.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 157-176, 191-205.
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sure that the remedy, once created, does not expand beyond its necessary
boundaries.
1. Constitutional Violations Versus Policy or Actions that Generate Common
Law Torts. - The presence of a constitutional, as opposed to a common
law, violation is essential for the Court to consider abrogating sovereign
immunity. The retention of sovereign immunity in the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act2 36 properly ensures
that the propriety of typical governmental policymaking will not be re-
viewed by the judiciary under the "reasonableness" inquiry applied in
common law tort claims. 23 7 Government must be afforded a certain lati-
tude in its policymaking and implementation, and courts are properly
cautious in treading on this allocation of power.
This rationale is less compelling in the context of violations of the
Constitution. 238 Traditional tort liability is concerned primarily with
compensation and deterrence, while constitutional tort liability is also
concerned with reinforcing constitutional norms, protecting the rule of
law, bolstering governmental legitimacy, and protecting the individual
from the excesses of the will of the majority.239 The Court has stated that
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Hand, C.J.) (presenting a formula for a reasonableness test as the function of the
variables of the probability of risk, the gravity of the resulting injury, and the burden of
adequate precaution).
238. The Court in the context of § 1983 actions has had to reconcile the availability of
a damage remedy for deprivations of property and liberty with the possibility that such a
remedy would transform every common law tort committed by a state or municipal official
acting under the color of law into a constitutional tort. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note
71, at 1268. To forestall this possibility, the Court has used § 1983 cases to sharply limit the
constitutional definition of liberty and property, and to find a scienter element in
constitutional torts cases. See id. at 1268-70. Certainly one negative consequence of a
cause of action under the Constitution is the risk that courts will interpret the scope of
constitutional protections narrowly in order to avoid liability. One response to this
problem in the context of potential judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity would be to
only allow damages where the constitutional provision at issue was clearly defined at the
time of the wrongdoing. See infra text accompanying notes 254-259.
Some have argued that constitutional torts are a more grievous wrong than common
law torts. See Byse, supra note 118, at 285 (citing the House Judiciary Committee Report
to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, H.R. Rep.
No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988)). At the least, they should be viewed as a different
species of liability.
239. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens v. Six Unknoum Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in which he wrote that "the Bill of Rights is particularly intended
to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in
legislative majorities." 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). As the court
noted in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
[g]overnment actors in cases such as this violate a different kind of duty from that
owed by a private tort defendant. Individuals in our society are largely left free to
pursue their own ends without regard for others, save a general duty not to harm
others by negligent conduct... The relationship between government and the
individual is fundamentally different. In a free society, government is neither an
autonomous actor nor a master to whom the people must acquiesce. The
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it should be for Congress to decide when to create liability, but the gen-
eral role of the Court in protecting constitutional fights seems to contra-
dict that rationale.2 4° Violations of constitutional rights involve abuse of
power, not mere unreasonableness.2 41 Liability as an incentive mecha-
nism is a legitimate tool for policing abuse of power,2 4 2 and the Court
should not continue to reject its use.
2. Enterprise Versus Individual Wrongdoing. - The Court should only
consider abrogating sovereign immunity in those contexts where the vio-
lation has occurred within the scope of official policymaking and imple-
mentation.243 There are two arguments for this limitation. First, as
function of government is to serve the people and to enhance the quality of life.
The broad purpose of all constitutional limits on government power is to ensure
that government does not stray from that role or abuse its power.
Id. at 817.
240. See Bandes, supra note 12, at 311 ("The use of the Constitution as a sword; the
willingness to enforce limits, which is the animating principle behind Bivens, rests on the
notion of positive checks on government espoused in Marbury.").
241. Cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held
that there was no deprivation of due process arising out of the negligence of a prison
official. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that only conscious process could
merit constitutional protection, and the negligent actions of officials, by definition, fall
outside the scope of the Due Process Clause. "Far from an abuse of power," the Court
noted, "lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a
reasonable person." Id. at 332.
242. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 100-18.
243. The Supreme Court has addressed liability arising out of policymaking, and the
inadequacy of respondeat superior liability, in the context of municipal liability under
§ 1983. In Monell v. Department of Social Savices, the Court found that as a matter of
congressional intent municipalities could be liable only for constitutional torts arising
"pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature." 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In
explicitly precluding liability through respondeat superior, the Court looked to the
language of the statute, and even more importantly to policy concerns arising out of any
broader conception of governmental liability. Specifically, the Court raised the concern
that the employee-employer relationship alone appeared insufficient to attach vicarious
liability in the context of constitutional violations. See id. at 692. The policy must cause
the injury, not the actions of an employee. See id. As noted, courts have also precluded
respondeat superior liability in Bivens cases. See supra note 58.
The definition of what constitutes "policy" generated much litigation following Monell.
Five paradigms of policy that generate liability have emerged: actions by a legislative body,
actions by boards and agencies with delegated legislative authority, actions by those with
final authority for making a decision, a governmental policy of inadequate training or
supervision, and a "custom." See Gellhorn & Byse, supra note 127, at 1303-05 (quoting
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.5, at 447-54 (2d ed. 1994)).
Travis argues that the Court should abrogate sovereign immunity for all
unconstitutional policymaking, along the lines that the Court adopted for municipal
liability in Monell. See Travis, supra note 12, at 626-37. Rejecting governmental liability
arising through respondeat superior from individual officials' wrongdoing in favor of the
kind of enterprise liability for policymaking described in Monell is an important narrowing
criteria in the decision to abrogate sovereign immunity. Using policymaking, however, as
the sole criterion for judicial abrogation, as Travis urges, would sweep too broadly. There
are a number of grounds on which a piece of legislation or an administrative action can be
found unconstitutional, from defects in procedural due process, see, e.g., Goldberg v.
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Bivens and its progeny made clear, a cause of action under the Constitu-
tion should only be recognized when absolutely necessary. 244 Given their
scope and complexity, constitutional mass torts are less likely to yield
remedies through individual suits against individual officers than typical
Bivens cases, which involve the kind of individual interaction characteris-
tic of traditional torts.245 What is "mass" about cases like the HRE is not
simply that the rights of so many individuals were violated-although this
certainly makes the necessity ofjudicial response in the absence of a con-
gressional remedy more compelling-but also that an undertaking the
size of the HRE allows responsible officials to hide behind the facade of a
massive governmental bureaucracy.246
Second, the Supreme Court is concerned about preserving the in-
centive effects of suits against individual officers.2 47 In cases like the
HRE, where policy was crafted at a high level of authority and imple-
mented on a wide scale, such deterrence has to take place at an institu-
tional level. Most Bivens actions arise in the context of individual federal
employees and officers who overreach the scope of their delegated au-
thority.248 When looking to the values of protecting constitutional integ-
rity, there is much less incentive for the Court to impose a remedy against
the government where it can be found that the wrongdoing occurred as
the result of an isolated incident or by the hand of an individual
tortfeasor.2 49 The Court should be concerned most about those situa-
tions in which a clearly adopted policy or custom works to violate consti-
tutional rights, and the more widely adopted the policy, the greater the
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a state that terminates public assistance benefits
without a hearing denies the recipient procedural due process), to overreaching of
congressional power, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994), as exceeding congressional
power under the Commerce Clause). Any court should be wary of creating a damage
remedy against a coordinate branch without a clearer sense of which violations of the
Constitution might merit judicial action. See Davis, supra note 12, at 71 ("Almost every
business in the country was adversely affected in some way by the National Industrial
Recovery Act the Court held unconstitutional in A.LA. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); should the United States have had to pay damages to every
such business?").
244. See supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 191-197.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 125-127.
248. Cf. Rosen, supra note 15, at 347 ("Bivens cases most often involve a government
employee just doing his job.").
249. This is not to say that Congress should not consider transferring the liability of
an officer who violates the Constitution to the United States as a means of better ensuring
compensation for constitutional violations. Whether any aggrieved plaintiff would pursue
a claim against an official when they could recover against the state, however, is debatable,
and in such a situation, administrative or legislative remedies against the offending official
might be necessary to ensure deterrence. See Madden et al., supra note 120, at 486-89
(arguing for administrative remedies against officials in the event that sovereign immunity
were waived for constitutional torts).
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incentive to act. Focusing on abrogating sovereign immunity only where
policy is concerned ensures that, on a practical level, incentive effects are
properly targeted at the institutional mechanisms that can prevent abuse.
In other words, if the government is liable, those in control of policy-
either in Congress or in the executive branch-will have a much greater
incentive to ensure that the entity for which they are responsible mini-
mizes the potential for abuse. 250
Finally, limiting abrogation of sovereign immunity to liability arising
from policymaking better reflects the role of the Court in upholding the
structural protections of the Constitution.2 1 Unlike private institutions,
public entities must balance more than risk of harm into any analysis of
the costs and benefits of a course of action. A governmental actor must
also consider the values and policy choices that its actions represent,252
notably whether those actions comport with constitutional protections for
individual rights. If judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity is to bol-
ster this element of official action, it must occur within the context of
policymaking. On the other hand, when an individual officer acts uncon-
stitutionally without the backing of an official policy, any court response
directed at the agency or the government as a whole is less likely to pro-
vide proper incentives to prevent such acts.2 3
3. Clear Constitutional Violations. - The decision to experiment on
unconsenting subjects in the HRE transgressed clear constitutional
prohibitions, and the impropriety of the policy could not have been in
doubt at the time.2 54 This suggests another important limiting factor.
250. See Bandes, supra note 12, at 341-42 (quoting Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980), for the proposition that damages might encourage policymakers
"to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of
unintentional infringements on constitutional rights... [particularly] in preventing those
'systemic' injuries that result... from the interactive behavior of several governmental
officials, each of whom may be acting in good faith").
251. Structural protections are those inherent in the limitations to federal power
contained in the "structural Constitution"-that part of the Constitution that outlines the
institutional powers of government, rather than enumerated individual rights. Madison,
before turning to the Bill of Rights, argued that the structure of government itself would
be a vital check on the potential for tyranny. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison)
(arguing that separation of powers in the Constitution would force the natural ambition of
the branches to serve as a check against domination); cf. Charles Black, Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law 11-32 (1969) (arguing that courts should be sensitive
to interpretations of the Constitution that arise from inferences drawn from the structure
of government).
252. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 101-02 (arguing that shifting the cost of public tort
remedies from individual officers to the government as a whole would reinforce the moral
underpinnings of the substantive rules governing official conduct).
253. See Bermann, supra note 70, at 1178, 1184 (discussing Carter v. Carlson, 447
F.2d 358, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court noted that "if the threat of personal
liability did not impair the officers' performance of duty, the threat of governmental
liability could not do so").
254. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 815 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(finding that "a reasonable government official must have known that by instigating and
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The Court should only act in those cases where liability arises out of
clearly understood constitutional principles. A suit for damages is not the
venue for the Court to articulate constitutional doctrine for the first time.
Limiting causes of action to clear constitutional violations responds to the
Court's concern about creating potentially vast liability. As the context of
suits against officers has shown, the qualified immunity standard disposes
of the bulk of cases filed each year at the procedural stage of a motion to
dismiss.255 Only acting where the violation is clear will limit the number
of constitutional claims courts have to decide, and ensure that only claims
arising from the most egregious violations survive the pleading stage.2 56
Courts have recognized in other contexts that it is fundamentally unfair
to impose liability in the absence of a clear indication of the normative
bounds within which parties are supposed to act, and the same insight
should apply when the Court contemplates creating new sources of liabil-
ity for the federal government.257
A simple way for the Court to approach this criterion would be to
retain the analysis that now guides the question of qualified immunity in
Bivens actions. The approach adopted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,258 for exam-
ple, would require a court to inquire whether the policymakers involved
in crafting a constitutional mass tort objectively should have known that
their actions would have violated the Constitution. 259 If a court deter-
mined that the strictures of the constitutional provision allegedly violated
were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have been aware
participating in the experimental administration of high doses of radiation on unwitting
subjects, he would have been acting in violation of [constimtional] rights").
It appears that at least some of the officials involved admitted their awareness of the
nature of their wrongdoing at the time. A 1950 confidential memorandum from Joseph G.
Hamilton, a Berkeley radiation biologist working on the HRE, expressed the feeling that
future generations would view the tests as "a little bit of Buchenwald," referring to the Nazi
concentration camp where experiments were undertaken on Jewish prisoners. See Lynn
Ludlow, Secret Plutonium Experiments, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 20, 1995, at C14.
For a discussion of the law of biomedical research and legal restraints imposed on that
research, see generally Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human
Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38
St. Louis U. LJ. 63 (1993).
255. Cf. Rosen, supra note 15, at 353 (noting that the Supreme Court has "warned the
lower courts to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure firmly, so as to ensure that
insubstantial Bivens suits were dismissed at the initial stages of the litigation").
256. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (arguing that qualified
immunity "should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment").
257. In the context of administrative actions, courts have held that under the Due
Process Clause, new substantive liability should only cut off the rights of a party where
adequate notice has been given. See General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (refusing, under the Due Process Clause, to allow the agency to impose a fine
where the regulatory provision on which it was relying was ambiguous).
258. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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that the policy at issue was unconstitutional, the cause of action would be
allowed.
4. Secret Policy Versus Policy Amenable to Political Discourse. - The over-
riding policy rationale for the current regime of sovereign and official
immunity is the protection of policymaking discretion.2 60 In most cases,
political checks remain on the exercise of power by the legislature and
the executive in the absence of judicial remedies. 26 ' Policymaking and
executive action that occur in secret, however, are not subject to such
political checks. The HRE is illustrative.2 6 2 From the inception of the
program in 1944, through 1993, when the Secretary of Energy decided to
reveal the experiments,2 63 the political process could not function in any
kind of meaningful way to correct the abuses inherent in the program.
Moreover, none of its victims knew about the program or the source of
the injuries they had received, and even the normal congressional over-
sight mechanism failed.2 64 The political dynamic facing victims seeking
redress from Congress decades after their injuries occurred is vastly dif-
ferent from the kind of vigorous public debate that ideally checks the
exercise of power.265
When a given policy is undertaken in secret, behind the shield of
national security, it should merit greater scrutiny by the Court.2 6 6 The
260. See supra Part I.B.
261. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46
(1915) (Holmes, J.) (limiting the right to due process where political checks exist on
governmental power); see also Krent, supra note 132, at 1539-58 (arguing that Congress
has retained sovereign immunity to safeguard national policymaking which is checked by
the political process).
262. It is not without irony that a section of the Department of Energy report on the
Human Radiation Experiments is entitled "Information as an Engine for Democratic
Government." See DOE Roadmap, supra note 2, at 10.
263. See Hilts, supra note 7, at A19.
264. Congressman Markey, for example, faced stonewalling by the Department of
Energy, and was not able to secure the information needed to expose the experiments in
1986, when he wrote the first report on the -IRE. See supra note 198.
265. As a practical matter, this concern will most often be presented in the context of
national security matters. For the bulk of daily governmental activity, the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), requires disclosure.
266. See Thomas I. Emerson, Introduction, Symposium: National Security and Civil
Liberties, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 685, 686 (1984) (arguing that secrecy under the veil of
national security deprives citizens of the ability to make informed judgments, and that "the
watch-dog institutions of the society-the courts, legislative committees, internal
mechanisms for supervision-are unable to perform the crucial task of oversight"). James
Madison warned that a "popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W. T.
Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 The Writings ofJames Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910);
see Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 753,
760-61 (1988) ("In an age when it can be argued thatjust about every sliver of information
has some connection with intelligence and national security, too much judicial deference
may be as great a danger to popular government as too little.").
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Court should be most vigilant in policing the excesses of coordinate
branches when there is no mechanism for political accountability and the
political process cannot work.26 7 In practice, however, courts generally
defer to the political branches in matters of national security.268 Under
the political question doctrine, the Court refrains from deciding ques-
tions that involve foreign affairs or similarly sensitive prerogatives; na-
tional security rationales presented by the executive fall within the ambit
of this deference. 26 9 The national security rationale has been successfully
used to prevent judicial review of the classification of information, 270 re-
strictions on travel abroad2 71 and curtailment of the right to political
association.2 72
The Court's deference in matters of national security is not without
exception. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sauyer (Steel Seizure),2 73 the
Court struck down President Truman's attempt to direct the Commerce
Department to seize domestic steel mills facing labor unrest during the
Korean War.274 Despite the pressing military need, 275 the Court refused
267. See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 101-04 (1980) (arguing for judicial
intervention where the political "market" is systematically malfunctioning).
268. See Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 69-91
(1990) (discussing the deference courts show in matters of foreign policy); see also C.
Herman Pritchett, National Security and the United States Judiciary, in The Constitution
and National Security 317-332 (Howard E. Shuman & Walter R. Thomas eds., 1990)
(surveying the role of the judiciary in national security matters).
269. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing the political question
doctrine and noting six rationales for judicial restraint); Louis Henkin, Is There A
"Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale LJ. 597, 622-23 (1976) (arguing that when courts
invoke the political question doctrine in foreign affairs, they are essentially validating the
constitutionality of the action of the political branch); see also Harold H. Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97
Yale LJ. 1255, 1305-17 (1988) (arguing that one reason the President has great latitude in
foreign affairs is the "astonishing regularity" with which the Court rules for the President,
and noting that "congeries of lower federal court cases ... have refused to hear challenges
to the legality of the Vietnam War and to various aspects of the Reagan Administration's
support for the contras").
270. See Robert P. Deying, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over
National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 67,
67 (1992) (noting that since the enactment of the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act allowing de novo judicial review of agency classification claims, "courts
have ruled on hundreds of cases involving classified information, affirming the
government's decision to withhold the requested information in nearly every case").
271. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) (sustaining the application of a State
Department regulation allowing the revocation of a passport if the passport holder was
deemed a threat to national security).
272. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 112-15
(1961) (upholding a requirement that the Communist Party register its membership with
the Attorney General).
273. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
274. See id. at 587-89.
275. The Government argued that the President's action was "necessary to avert a
national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production."
Id. at 582.
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to allow the President to operate under the constitutional grant of power
as Commander-in-Chief outside the zone of hostilities without express
congressional approval.2 76 In Steel Seizure, the Court asserted a role, at
least in the domestic arena, in ensuring that the executive acts within
constitutional bounds. This suggests that, despite the invocation of na-
tional security, the Court will intervene if a coordinate branch clearly
lacks constitutional authority.277 If the impetus for the Court to interfere
with the national security prerogatives of the executive is a question of
the degree of the violation involved, cases like the HRE should fall on the
Steel Seizure side of the Court's precedence, given the nature and extent of
the executive wrongdoing at issue.
2 78
Where these criteria are met, as in the HRE, the Court should find a
remedy against the United States under the Constitution in the absence
of congressional action. Some fear a massive surge in suits if the Court
creates a damage remedy against the United States for constitutional vio-
lations like the HRE.2 79 Prudential judicial control over the scope of
damages awarded and the contexts in which they would be granted, how-
ever, is a better way to control the scope of liability than a simple rule of
sovereign immunity. Since the Court is interpreting the Constitution to
create a damage remedy, it could tailor the remedy to balance compensa-
276. See id. at 587-89.
277. See also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972)
(rejecting government arguments that Fourth Amendment protections did not apply in
domestic security investigations); New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers),
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (refusing to uphold prior restraint on the publication of a secret
history of the Vietnam War, despite claims of national security); cf. Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (reaffirming that "where Congress intends to precludejudicial review
of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear") (citingJohnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361 (1974) and Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 191-205.
279. Kenneth R. Feinberg, a member of the Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments, has argued that the "mere possibility of compensation breeds a
proliferation of grievances-real and imagined." Kenneth R. Feinberg, Radiation and
Responsibility, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1995, at A23. In response to the potential for such an
onslaught of claims, Feinberg notes that the Committee sharply limited recommended
compensation-and limited the number of individuals to whom it felt the government
should apologize-because "legitimate outrage over random, unauthorized radiation
experiments should not automatically lead to an open-ended run on the federal Treasury."
Id. The Advisory Committee recommended that only a handful of victims receive
compensation and a few hundred receive formal apologies from the United States. See
Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 801-02. The Committee determined
compensation based on two primary factors: the level of physical injury and the degree to
which "hard evidence" of the government willfully promoting experimentation without
consent or hindering the disclosure of the nature of such experiments was available. See
Feinberg, supra, at A23. It is unclear how the Committee was able to find that the bulk of
the experimentation was done in secret without adequate requirements for disclosure and
still conclude that so few victims deserve compensation and an apology. See Advisory
Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 792-95.
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tion with the need to protect the public fisc.2 80 Moreover, the Court re-
tains a number of threshold justiciability requirements-notably stand-
ing-that could be employed to limit the pool of potential claimants to
those who were able to demonstrate an actual injury, fairly traceable to
the government's actions.281 The criteria for finding a constitutional
mass tort provide one limiting factor to the fear of a flood of litigation,
and the Court's ability to control the federal docket through the require-
ments of justiciability and by defining the scope of the remedy provides
another.282
CONCLUSION
Just as courts struggled to adapt traditional notions of tort liability to
the new context of mass torts, they should recognize that in the context
of constitutional torts there are situations where the paradigm of an indi-
vidual officer violating the constitutional rights of an individual does not
apply. In those cases, courts must move beyond current limits on consti-
tutional liability. When the violation of individual rights arises out of
longstanding, clearly-defined policy, backed by the vast resources of the
federal government, in an environment cut off from the normal mecha-
nisms of political oversight, courts should create a cause of action against
280. Nothing in the argument above should be read to undermine congressional
power to act within the scope of its delegated authority to provide an alternative remedy
that it considers equally effective to protect constitutional rights. See Dellinger, supra note
12, at 1546-49. Any congressional decision that effectively extended immunity would then
be subject to bicameralism and presentment, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 7, in a way that the
"decision" by silence not to waive sovereign immunity for constitutional violations is not.
Congressional action appropriately rests on popular political will. The Court, however, has
been extremely careful to ensure that Congress will not affect the rights of individuals
outside the legislative branch without the protection of bicameralism and presentment, see
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and it has been equally careful to construe
congressional delegation to agencies narrowly so as to avoid unconstitutionality. See Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
281. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (laying out the
constitutional minima of standing to sue in federal court as injury-in-fact, fairly traceable to
the action of the defendant, redressable by a favorable decision). The Court's
redressability requirement would be met in any damages action.
This raises an additional difficulty for constitutional mass torts like the HRE. One
characteristic of a constitutional mass tort is the difficulty of connecting individual
plaintiffs with those officers most directly involved in the decision to experiment. See
supra text accompanying notes 191-205. Courts, when examining the justiciability of any
individual plaintiff's claim, then, may have difficulty with the causation element of
standing, and would have to approach this requirement with a certain degree of flexibility.
282. If a glut of constitutional claims exists that could meet the constitutional minima
of justiciability and would be successful but for sovereign immunity, such a surfeit of
grievances would appear to be an argument in favor of creating a remedy rather than
perpetuating the remedy's absence. Moreover, as the experience with Bivens
demonstrates, the Court has not allowed the possibility of personal liability under the
Constitution to be abused. See supra note 15. There is no reason to believe that the Court
could not exercise similar restraint in crafting a remedy against the United States, and
ensure that meritless claims be weeded out at the earliest stage of pleading.
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the government. The question in a constitutional mass tort situation is
not whether an individual official will be deterred, but whether the insti-
tution as a whole has mechanisms in place to ensure that wide-scale depri-
vations of constitutional rights do not occur.
Limiting the remedy to constitutional mass torts ensures the creation
of a narrow exception to the current doctrine of sovereign immunity, not
a wholesale abandonment of a generally workable regime. The Court
believes that Congress, and by extension the political process, should be
responsible for deciding questions of the allocation of the financial bur-
den generated by governmental wrongdoing. Where the conditions de-
scribed in this Note are met, however, the political process has broken
down and there is little chance that a plaintiff will gain a meaningful rem-
edy from the political branches. Judicial abrogation of sovereign immu-
nity in that case should allow the Court to provide a remedy for an egre-
gious breakdown of traditional constitutional protections without
overreaching its position in the constitutional system or undermining the
general protections it has built for vigorous governance. Despite the
Court's recent pronouncement that the logic of Bivens does not support a
remedy directly against the government, when the federal government
does fundamental violence to the liberties of the citizens of the United
States, the Constitution, and the judiciary's duty to uphold it, must over-
come judicial caution.
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